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ABSTRACT 
 With an ongoing pivot toward great power competition, there may be a temptation 
to reduce counter-proliferation efforts against violent non-state actors (VNSA) to a 
peripheral mission for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). However, the 
current and emerging threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition and use 
by VNSA are increasing through the ubiquity of various technologies, materials, and 
internet access. This research analyzes the use of chemical weapons (CW) by VNSA and 
the unique challenges of detecting and combating CW at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels. This research first implements regression models using chemical incident 
data from 1995–2017 to identify which strategic and operational environments are 
associated with VNSA CW adoption, and uses the outcomes to create a template for 
predictive intelligence methods for chemical threats. Next, the researchers conduct social 
network analysis to investigate commonalities among VNSA with chemical programs, 
and to determine if these CW tactics are geographically migrating. Then, lessons learned 
from the case study involving al-Qaeda in Iraq yield a proposed disruption model tested 
in a plausible, near-future scenario. Finally, policy recommendations are provided for 
USSOCOM and other relevant entities to improve counter-WMD efforts as they relate to 
the prediction and disruption of the chemical programs of VNSA. 
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In 2016, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assumed the role as the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) 
synchronizer, prompting renewed effort to investigate the DoD’s CWMD role, how 
USSOCOM can orchestrate it, and how to better define what DoD’s place is among the 
various U.S. CWMD stakeholders. A particular topic within this discussion that should be 
better explored involves chemical weapon (CW) adoption and use by violent non-state 
actors (VNSA). Enhancing awareness of the environmental factors that contribute to a 
VNSA’s decision and ability to adopt CW could aid USSOCOM’s ability to develop 
appropriate methods and policies to counter and prepare for potential CW use. 
This paper’s methods include modeling how conflict influences CW use over time 
and social network analysis (SNA) on VNSA inter-organizational alliance networks to 
discern patterns of how CW may migrate from one organization to another.  
The modeling portion suggests there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between an increase in the severity (number of deaths) of conflict and CW use 
among VNSA. This suggests VNSA will more often adopt CW in high-intensity conflict 
compared to low-intensity conflict. The SNA portion suggests CW migration from one 
VNSA to another requires a highly active (connected) VNSA to be successful.  
The results from the modeling and SNA are used to inform a notional agent-based 
model (ABM) using a contemporary inter-organizational alliance network in Myanmar that 
provides a means of predictive analysis based on running the model multiple times. The 
results from the ABM suggest, in a minimally developed theater, kinetic operations are 
initially more effective than information operations (IO) but overtaken by IO effectiveness 
over longer time periods.  
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A. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
The Washington Post published an article in January, 2019 describing Iraqi 
geologist Suleiman al-Afari’s experience as the Islamic State (IS) made its way through 
Mosul, Iraq in 2014.1 Upon finding al-Afari, IS militants offered him a position to help 
them develop CW. Despite limited knowledge of CW, al-Afari accepted the position and 
commenced a 15-month endeavor to develop a supply chain for lethal chemical agents such 
as Sulfur mustard (C4H8Cl2S), commonly known as mustard gas. Al-Afari reflected it was 
clear how important it was for the IS to make something that could terrify the masses. 
When asked if he regretted his role, he replied “They had become the government and we 
now worked for them. We wanted to work so we could get paid.”2 Once the paychecks 
from the Iraqi government ceased, there were many like al-Afari who had to choose 
between working with the new terrorist regime or being left behind with nothing. From this 
situation, we see the value in identifying and exploring how CW tactics proliferate across 
organizations, and this thesis aims to assess why some inter-organizational networks enable 
CW proliferation and others do not, as well as compare different disruption techniques at 
the intersection of the operational and strategic levels of warfare. Thus, what environmental 
factors drive CW proliferation from one organization to another and what indicators may 
be developed to identify that potential migration? 
Al-Afari’s story speaks to the importance of acquiring and leveraging expertise for 
terrorist organizations to develop CW. Even while under considerable external duress from 
coalition forces, the IS attained unprecedented access to university laboratories, industrial 
 
1 Joby Warrick, “Exclusive: Iraqi Scientist Says He Helped ISIS Make Chemical Weapons,” The 






complexes, and to a workforce with few options in Mosul.3 What resulted was a mix of 
crudely weaponized Chlorine and low-grade mustard gas combined with various delivery 
systems like mortars and rockets. In response, the United States initiated a campaign 
targeting suspected IS chemists and chemical production centers in Mosul and Hit, Iraq.4 
The strikes against chemical production centers, coupled with IS territorial losses, severely 
hindered its ability to develop a CW capability.5 As Herbert Tinsley et al. conclude, the 
IS’s tactical application of CW and the chemical agents themselves remained 
unsophisticated.6 Following their analysis, Tinsley et al. suggested that the IS may have 
used its limited CW capability as a means to target uninformed adversaries who may not 
have fully understood the lack of toxic potency or how CW works; they also pointed out 
that contrary to conventional wisdom, the group did not use propaganda to capitalize on its 
CW use.7 Such analysis leads one to conclude that the IS viewed CW as a military-versus-
military weapon rather than an appropriate method to conduct terror attacks. Thus, a 
weapon considered a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the most recent guidance 
within the National Strategy for Countering WMD Terrorism 2018 was used more 
tactically than strategically.8  
Not only do uncertainties remain surrounding the IS’s perception of CW utility and 
how it applies to its overall strategic plan, but CW use also brings back the nearly two-





6 Herbert Tinsley et al., “Islamic State Chemical and Biological Weapons Behavior Profile” (College 
Park, MD: START, 2017), 15. 
7 Ibid. 
8 White House, National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: White House Office, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=819382. 
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mid 1990s: Are CW becoming more acceptable and obtainable by Violent Non State Actors 
(VNSA)?9  
The answer, as the historical record indicates, likely consists of a more conservative 
conclusion suggesting that the successful adoption and implementation of a CW capability 
must take into account a series of complex methods, a dedication of resources, and an 
educated pool of personnel to draw upon which makes developing CW weapons a 
conscience and costly decision.10 Thus far, only the IS and Aum Shinrikyo were able to 
develop a modest CW capability and did so under unique circumstances. However, the 
record also shows that a steady number of VNSA from various backgrounds are 
increasingly turning to chemical agents as a suitable weapon, demonstrating that the issue 
of how and where to conduct counter-proliferation (CP) efforts is likewise increasingly 
necessary.  
B. BACKGROUND 
In 2016, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assumed the role as the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) 
synchronizer, prompting a renewed effort to investigate what the DoD’s CWMD role is, 
how USSOCOM can orchestrate it, and how to better define what DoD’s place is among 
the various U.S. CWMD stakeholders. A particular topic within this discussion that should 
be better explored involves chemical weapon (CW) adoption and use by VNSA. Enhancing 
awareness of the environmental factors that contribute to a VNSA’s decision and ability to 
 
9 Brian A. Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by 
Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 3 (2001): 204, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100151130270. 
10 Stephanie E. Meulenbelt and Maarten S. Nieuwenhuizen, “Non-State Actors’ Pursuit of CBRN 
Weapons: From Motivation to Potential Humanitarian Consequences,” International Review of the Red 
Cross 97, no. 899 (2015): 831–58, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383116000011. 
 
4 
adopt CW could aid USSOCOM’s ability to develop appropriate methods and policies to 
counter and prepare for potential CW use.11  
This suggestion may be considered in concert with the Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community released in January 2019 which projects 
“the overall threat from WMD [will continue to] grow during 2019, and we note in 
particular the threat posed by chemical warfare following the most significant and 
sustained use of chemical weapons to date.”12 The assessment goes on to suggest the 
continued use of CW weakens the international norms against its use and shifts the cost-
benefit analysis in such a manner that may entice more actors to consider their development 
and use.  
Furthermore, to advance the CWMD mission, the White House’s National Security 
Strategy for Countering WMD Terrorism 2018 identified the following objectives: 
• The agents, precursors, and materials needed to acquire WMD are placed 
beyond the reach of terrorists and other malicious non-state actors, and 
the global quantity of WMD and related materials is reduced.  
• States and individuals are deterred from providing support to would-be 
WMD terrorists.  
• An effective architecture is in place to detect and defeat terrorist WMD 
networks.  
• United States defenses against WMD terrorism are strengthened, and 
state, local, tribal, and territorial preparedness to contend with WMD 
threats is enhanced.  
• The United States is able to identify and respond to technological trends 
that may enable terrorist development, acquisition, or use of WMD.13 
Likewise, the National Security Strategy 2017 provides overarching guidance that 
contends counter-terrorism (CT) operations include those conducted against WMD 
 
11 “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas III, U.S. Army Commander United States Special 
Operations Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” § Senate Armed Services 
Committee (2017), https://www.socom.mil/pages/posture-statement-sasc.aspx. 
12 Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community” (Office of 
the Director of National Security, January 29, 2019), 8. 
13 White House, National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: White House Office, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=819382. 
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specialists, financiers, administrators, and facilitators.14 From the National Security 
Strategy and the National Strategy for Countering WMD Terrorism, it may be presumed 
VNSA CW use is a priority, but what can USSOCOM do to advance CP efforts against 
VNSA CW use to better meet its lines of effort? Furthermore, are the lines of effort even 
effective at stopping VNSA CW use? 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Significance 
Ultimately, this study aims to support USSOCOM and associated stakeholders 
involved in CP and CT within the CWMD mission with an improved understanding of how 
CW migrates among VNSA to provide indications that can support better intelligence 
collection efforts and minimize uncertainty when considering kinetic and information 
operations. To accomplish this, we first examine how a conflict’s character affects the 
probability a VNSA would adopt CW. Second, we examine how a CW capability may 
migrate through the inter-organizational VNSA alliance structure to identify potential new 
opportunities to disrupt the flow of knowledge and material from one organization to 
another. Using the results from these two approaches, we analyze potential disruption 
methods that leverage USSOCOM’s core competencies, such as direct action and 
information operations (IO) by using the VNSA alliance network within Myanmar.  
Instead of taking common approaches found in previous scholarly work such as 
case studies or intra-organizational methods that analyze internal motivators for CW 
development, this research takes an inter-organizational approach of social network 
analysis (SNA) and applies it to a contemporary VNSA network.15 We aim to discern 
which alliances could potentially influence a VNSA’s ability to develop CW. Here, 
 
14 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House Office, December 2017), 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-
12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 
15 Meulenbelt and Nieuwenhuizen, “Non-State Actors’ Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” 2; Gary A. 
Ackerman et al., “Profiling the CB Adversary: Motivation, Psychology and Decision” (College Park, MD: 
START, 2017). 
6 
alliances consist of recorded relationships like a pledged allegiance and cooperative 
training and operations. The questions of concern here are: 
How does the nature of conflict affect a VNSA’s ability to innovate and adopt a 
CW capability? 
How does an alliance network of VNSA, at the organization level, support the 
migration of CW use?  
Does a VNSA’s position within the alliance network, and the centrality of a group 
provide some indication that CW tactics will migrate to other groups within that alliance 
network? 
Are kinetic operations or IO efforts more effective if the strategic objective is to 
contain the spread of a tactic or technological attribute? 
D. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
By taking an external view of the VNSA CW proliferation problem, the research 
conducted here determined a number of findings that may benefit policy development as 
USSOCOM further engages itself as the DoD’s CWMD synchronizing entity: 
• The lethality (death-rate) of state-based conflict acts as a better predictor of 
CW use than the intensity (number of events) of state-based conflict in a 
country-year. 
• Wealthier, more populated, and more democratic states have a higher 
probability of experiencing a VNSA CW attack. 
• There is a non-linear association between the lethality of conflict and the 
probability a VNSA uses CW. While there is a slight decline of CW 
probability at lower lethality levels, there is a relatively dramatic increase 
in probability at higher levels. 
• Since 1995, VNSA have increasingly turned to using chemical agents, 
making the probability of a CW attack more likely today than in the past 
two decades. 
• An alliance network’s topology is the strongest factor in determining how 
quickly a technology can migrate across multiple organizations. 
7 
• If a particular organization already has a CW capability, that organization’s 
power (by virtue of its brokerage or centrality measures) has a significant 
effect on whether the CW capability will migrate throughout the network. 
• With lower diffusion rates of CW technologies in an inter-organizational 
network, coercive disruption (which includes kinetic and non-kinetic action 
degrading/disrupting a VNSA’s CW capability) performs better initially, 
but over longer timeframes, IO disruption (which targets the lines of 
communication between VNSA in physical or information domains) is 
more effective in countering CW technology migration. 
• With higher diffusion rates, IO disruption performs slightly better than 
coercion initially, but over longer timeframes both strategies produce 
similar results. 
• It could benefit CWMD practitioners to incorporate relevant assets 
(Medical, EOD, Engineers, and other CBRN response entities) into non-
kinetic targeting and planning, so that the various strategies under 
consideration have a full-spectrum CWMD perspective ranging from 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before addressing this thesis’ methods, conclusions, and potential policy 
implications geared towards VNSA CP efforts, a review of relevant literature is necessary 
to identify where the VNSA CW debate currently resides. Although this research looks at 
a specific issue among the larger VNSA and debate, it nevertheless touches on several 
academic fields of study. This review attempts to address those debates identified as 
relevant by examining theories associated with WMD categorization, deterrence, counter-
proliferation efforts, and how organizations adopt new technologies. 
Our review first discusses the misuse of state-centric proliferation analysis along 
with the small, but growing, literature aimed directly at understanding the unique 
complexities inherent in VNSA CW development. Second, deterrence theory and its 
applicability to VNSA and WMD proliferation will be addressed. Third, conclusions across 
the overarching proliferation literature will be covered to highlight the current consensus 
that offers the foundation for current counter-proliferation efforts. Fourth, the debate 
surrounding the validity of the perceived threat VNSA pose regarding chemical weapon 
development and use is covered. Lastly, a discussion is presented regarding the technology 
adoption model (TAM) framework,  which describes factors affecting a VNSA’s ability to 
adopt new technologies, along with migration and contagion theories to substantiate the 
foundation this research resides upon.16  
The conclusions derived from this review suggest CW counter-proliferation efforts 
targeting VNSA could be modified to not exclusively focus on supply-chain mitigation, 
but to identify those VNSA that are susceptible to incorporating a CW capability based on 
 
16 Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons 
from Private Sector Technology Adoption”; Gary A. Ackerman et al., “Profiling the CB Adversary: 
Motivation, Psychology and Decision” (College Park, MD: START, 2017); Gary A. Ackerman et al., 
“Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries: Identifying the Adversary,” Project on 
Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), Center on Contemporary Conflict, 
Naval Postgraduate School (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, January 2014). 
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external pressures and are well-placed within an inter-organizational alliance network to 
receive requisite knowledge, materials, and tactics. 
A. A GAP IN COUNTER-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS? 
Both non- and counter-proliferation policy recommendations provided by some of 
the literature regarding VNSA CW programs and associated illicit supply networks are 
often considered through a lens perhaps more aptly suited for state- and international-level 
WMD affairs. From this vantage, VNSA involvement in the CW realm remains relegated 
to witting and unwitting supply-chain enablers for illicit state-level programs or that a 
VNSA’s own capability to conduct a mass CW attack is severely limited and requires little 
counter-proliferation attention or resources.17 Although useful in their own right, these 
conclusions are based on a perception that the utility CW provides is reserved for strategic 
effects and fail to realize that CW, in the hands of VNSA (and states for that matter), are 
predominately used to meet tactical ends. As David Rapoport and John Parachini 
accurately surmise, the threat of a VNSA CW attack on a scale capable of killing or 
 
17 Brian A. Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by 
Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption” 204; Daniel Salisbury, “Why Do Entities Get Involved 
in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit WMD-Related Trade,” The Nonproliferation Review 
24, no. 3–4 (2017): 297, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1423718; Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Future 
of Chemical Weapons,” The New Atlantis, no. 26 (Fall  /Winter 2010 2009): 3, 12–13, 22–28; David C. 
Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” in Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, 
ed. James M. Ludes and Henry Sokolski, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2014), 25–26; John Parachini, 
“Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003): 38, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/016366003322387091; Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychology of WMD Terrorism,” 
International Studies Review, Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 7 (2005) 
148; Aaron Arnold, “A Resilience Framework for Understanding Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks,” 
Strategic Trade Review 3, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 3. 
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incapacitating on a massive scale is low, however, that does not mean VNSA are shying 
away from adopting CW agents.18 
To this point, Gary Ackerman concludes “There is sufficient evidence to conclude 
that a variety of terrorist groups and individuals espousing different ideologies have either 
considered using CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear] weapons or 
have attempted to acquire CBRN weapons capability.”19 Thus, without direct analysis 
considering VNSA and CW proliferation, resulting conclusions and policy suggestions 
may not reveal all potential options that could enhance counter-proliferation efforts.20 At 
best, this limited scope may only lead to extending the time it would take for a VNSA to 
acquire CW rather than stopping or preventing development altogether. 
The gap in policy consideration associated with the relationship between VNSA 
and CW may stem from the overarching term, “WMD,” often found in many media reports 
and official policies, which may erroneously suggest that the components under its 
umbrella—CBRN—are similar, or at least share important commonalities. Despite those 
who acknowledge that there are more differences than similarities among the WMD family, 
this bias often reveals itself in much of the literature that continually suggests attention to 
WMD supply-chains and supply-chain entities is of paramount importance—that WMD 
 
18 David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” in Twenty-First Century 
Weapons Proliferation, ed. James M. Ludes and Henry Sokolski, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2014), 25–
26; John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003): 
38, https://doi.org/10.1162/016366003322387091; James Revill, “Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption 
of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU,” European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 8 (2017): 641; William Morgan Alley and Jessica L. Jones, “An Analysis of the Threat of 
Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: Questioning the State-Based Approach to Chemical 
Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 3–4 (2015): 310, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1159373. 
19 Gary Ackerman, “Defining Knowledge Gaps within CBRN Terrorism Research,” in 
Unconventional Weapons and International Terrorism: Challenges and New Approaches, 1st ed. 
(Routledge, 2009), 14 . 
20 Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘Weapons 
of Mass Destruction,’ 515. 
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proliferation is a supply-chain issue.21 As such, non- and counter-proliferation policy 
recommendations run the gamut of modifying industry normative behavior; universalizing 
supply-chain restrictions; securing surplus WMD-related material; enhancing illicit 
supply-chain detection mechanisms; and deterring transnational criminal organizations.22 
Although useful, these conclusions leave the CW counter-proliferation effort focused on 
large-scale WMD programs and the daunting task of identifying a handful of needles in the 
global commerce haystack, which is made exponentially more difficult when considering 
the infinitesimal indications suggesting a VNSA is pursuing CW and is often satisfied with 
unsophisticated chemical agents and delivery mechanisms.23 As Morgan Jones and Jessica 
Alley contend, it is not that current programs to inhibit CW proliferation by state actors are 
wrong, but that those same efforts are ill-suited to counter VNSA.24 
To diverge from the WMD generalization, VNSA CW proliferation must be 
considered as a problem in-and-of itself and not just a part of the greater WMD non- and 
counter-proliferation effort. The limited, but growing, amount of literature focused on this 
field suggests a necessity to view VNSA CW proliferation on its own due to three 
fundamental characteristics: 1) VNSA CW use does not necessarily meet the WMD model 
upon which current non- and counter-proliferation policies are founded; 2) CW supply-
chains do not hold similar characteristics as supply chains for other WMD; and 3) non-
 
21 Gary A. Ackerman et al., “Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries: 
Identifying the Adversary,” Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), 
Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School (College Park, MD: National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, January 2014), 17. 
22 James J. Wirtz, “Counter-Terrorism via Counter-Proliferation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
14, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 129–140; David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, “Detecting and 
Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade after A. Q. Khan,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2010): 85–106, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01636601003673857; Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” 543–568; 
Daniel Salisbury, “Why Do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit 
WMD-Related Trade,” The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 3–4 (2017): 297–314, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1423718. 
23 Alley and Jones, “An Analysis of the Threat of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: 
Questioning the State-Based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation, 310.” 
24 Ibid., 310. 
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state actors are not beholden to the same international norms or pressures as most state 
actors.25 
First, as scholars such as Gary Ackerman, Michelle Jacome, Thomas Graham Jr, 
Keith Hansen, Thomas McNaugher, James Revill, and Ashton Carter contend, labeling all 
CBRN weapons as WMD is fundamentally inaccurate.26 Essentially, all WMD consist of 
CBRN, but not all CBRN should be considered WMD. While McNaugher warns against 
overstating CW effectiveness or elevating CW to the WMD status, as this may entice states 
to acquire them. Graham and Hansen contend CW may be best categorized as “weapons 
of mass casualties,” or “disruption” as coined by Stephanie Meulenbelt and Maarten 
Nieuwenhuizen, rather than weapons of mass destruction.27 Carter suggests CW is more 
synonymous with conventional weapons, but Ackerman and Jacome provide a more 
nuanced approach by advising the amount, nature, and sophistication of the chemical and 
delivery mechanism should play a factor when labeling use of a CW as WMD or as an 
attack using a chemical agent.28 From this aspect, Ackerman and Jacome state VNSA have 
 
25  Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome, “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat,” Prism 7, 
no. 3 (May 15, 2018): 23; Breiger and Pinson, “A New Approach for Identification of Multiple Threat 
Scenarios to Counter CBRN Networks,” 157; Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, “Deterrence & 
Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda” (RAND Corporation, 2002), XVIII; 
Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,” 
International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 5–34. 
26 Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome, “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat,” 23; 
Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in 
Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2009), loc 72 of 3995, Kindle; Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The 
Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 5–34; Revill, “Past as Prologue? 
The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU,” 631; Ashton 
Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Council on Foreign Relations 83, no. 5 (n.d.), 73. 
27 McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,” 8; 
Graham Jr. and Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, loc 72 of 3995, Kindle; Meulenbelt and Nieuwenhuizen, 
“Non-State Actors’ Pursuit of CBRN Weapons: From Motivation to Potential Humanitarian 
Consequences,” 858. 
28 Graham Jr. and Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to 
Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, loc 170 of 3995, Kindle; Gary Ackerman and 
Michelle Jacome, “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat,” Prism 7, no. 3 (May 15, 2018): 23; 
Ashton Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Council on Foreign Relations 83, no. 5 (n.d.), 73. 
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conducted CW attacks, but none have met the “WMD” threshold.29 Although the 
“threshold” is left ambiguous, it may be discerned through the historical record that VNSA 
have not yet met the level of chemical agent and delivery mechanism sophistication 
equating to a strategic-level weapon, but have typically conducted operations with, as 
Revill terms, “scruffy” or crude chemical agents.30 Ted Gurr seconds this assessment 
highlighting that he is “…not aware of WMD use by any of the 300 politically significant 
minorities that have been tracked since the 1980s by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
project…”31 To further complicate the issue, Revill points out, CW has been used for 
purposes other than killing, suggesting that not only is CW not necessarily a WMD, but 
that it can be used for temporary purposes.32 These distinctions prove relevant to counter-
proliferation efforts when such activities are predominately aimed towards proliferation on 
a “grander” scale as they may lose efficacy at the granular—non-state—level.  
Second, as David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Graham, and Hansen argue, where 
nuclear weapon development has certain “tells” derived from highly specific materials, 
technology, and facilities that make the supply-chain exceptionally worthy of attention, 
CW production by VNSA may be produced without tipping off monitoring and 
enforcement agencies.33 Apart from the more advanced chemical agents (e.g., VX and 
Sarin), precursor chemicals and necessary equipment are readily available in the open and 
 
29 Ackerman and Jacome, “WMD Terrorism,” 24. 
30 Revill, “Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-
State Actors in the EU,” 627. 
31 Ted Robert Gurr, “Which Minorities Might Use Weapons of Mass Destruction?,” International 
Studies Review, Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 7 (2005), 143. 
32 Revill, “Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-
State Actors in the EU,” 631. 
33 Graham Jr. and Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to 
Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, loc 32 of 3995, Kindle; David Albright and Andrea 
Stricker, “The World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Present and Future,” in Preventing Black-Market Trade in 
Nuclear Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 47. 
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little-monitored market and have been used arguably to effectively meet tactical goals.34 
Adding to this point, Ackerman and Jacome address newer technologies like chemical 
microreactors that may be used to subvert nearly any export control measure.35 Although 
continuous monitoring and export control functions remain a necessary component to 
support countering VNSA CW proliferation, it may be beneficial for counter-proliferation 
practitioners to reconsider the notion that VNSA CW proliferation is simply another WMD 
issue and instead develop a framework that considers how externalities affect the level of 
demand a VNSA has in developing a CW capability. Instead of focusing on the supply-
side of CW development, in the case of VNSA, it may be more beneficial to identify which 
VNSA exhibits a higher demand signal. 
Despite some effort to support a doctrinal shift to counter VNSA CW proliferation, 
particularly embodied by 2018 National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism, the analytical basis necessary to operationalize such doctrine is 
either misappropriated or remains in its infancy.36 This lack of attention may stem from 
the practice, as Ersel Aydinli argues, that appears to regulate VNSA analysis to a sub-area 
of terrorism and criminal studies, thus leaving VNSA outside the realm of analysis 
typically focused on state-to-state interactions (e.g., proliferation and international 
relations).37 As well, Brian Jackson observes, prior to the mid-1990s, most scholarly 
research concluded WMD adoption remained outside the terrorist desired goals and are 
ultimately incompatible, leaving further research something of a moot point.38 Jackson 
continues with identifying the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo chemical attack in Japan as a pivotal 
 
34 Alley and Jones, “An Analysis of the Threat of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: 
Questioning the State-Based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation.” 
35 Ackerman and Jacome, “WMD Terrorism,” 31. 
36 White House, National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: White House Office, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=819382. 
37 Ersel Aydinli, Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists (New York: Rutledge, 2016). 
38 Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons 
from Private Sector Technology Adoption, 204.” 
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moment that swung the scholarly debate to conclude terrorist groups will quickly adopt 
CW from any number of sources.39 However, this conclusion is as erroneous as its 
predecessor and lacks the appropriate scholarly rigor seen in state-level affairs. Although 
there exists some high-level policy concerns regarding potential VNSA launching chemical 
attacks, little has been done to understand “…the motivations, psychology and decision-
making of the potential perpetrators themselves.”40 As the pendulum swings between 
accounts based upon VNSA chemical abstinence on one end and universal chemical 
adoption on the other, careful research may help the pendulum find its proper placement. 
B. DETERRENCE AND THE VNSA QUAGMIRE 
There remains an unresolved question as to whether deterrence theory can be aptly 
applied to VNSA as they operate below the state level. Scholars such as Emmanuel Adler 
and T.V. Paul highlight the notion that deterrence against asymmetric adversaries (e.g., 
terrorist groups and insurgencies) takes the theory out of the arena is was designed for—
state-to-state interaction.41 With this in mind, a debate certainly exists within the literature 
as to whether or not deterrence is a viable strategy against asymmetric adversaries.42 To 
this point, Lawrence Freedman and David Auerswald suggest VNSA may be deterred, but 
the overarching classical, generalized deterrence requires modification.43 Such 
modification, as Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel cite, was holistically adopted in the 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which promoted the Pentagon’s shift to tailored 
 
39 Ibid., 204. 
40 Gary A. Ackerman et al., “Profiling the CB Adversary: Motivation, Psychology and Decision” 
(College Park, MD: START, 2017), 3. 
41 T.V. Paul, “Complex Deterrence,” in Complex Deterrence Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 15; Emanuel Adler, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-
Warfare Era,” in Complex Deterrence in the Global Age (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 
85. 
42 For examples see: Robert F. Trager and Dissislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be 
Done,” International Security 30, no. 6 (Winter 2005): 87–123; Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The 
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005). 
43 Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” Academy of Political Science 121, no. 4 (Winter 
2006 / 2007): 543–568; Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008). 
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deterrence strategies designed for revisionist or rogue powers, VNSA, and for near-peer 
competitors.44 The Pentagon’s shift appears to diminish the once conventional thought 
terrorists are irrational and undeterrable. 
Deterrence, a concept central to strategic discourse during the Cold War between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, has experienced episodes of the highest 
importance, disdain, rejection, and modification.45 At its core, Freedman contends 
deterrence is a practice of coercion, where a deterring state threatens actual or potential 
punishment in an attempt to stop another state from taking or continuing an unwanted 
action.46 This classical deterrence is based on three principals, as Paul illustrates: 1) the 
deterring state must have adequate capacity to carry out the threat conveyed, 2) the threat 
must be credible, in that it must be severe enough to stop the target state’s action but not 
so severe that actually carrying out the threat is perceived unlikely, 3) and last, the deterring 
state must be able to communicate the threat to the target state unambiguously.47 As well, 
traditional deterrence theory assumes the belligerents are unitary, rational, and fully 
informed actors.48 Deterrence, therefore, achieves success when the target state makes the 
rational decision to abstain from conducting the unwanted activity out of fear of reprisal. 
Thus, classical deterrence theory relies firmly on a rational calculation that proposed 
punishments would increase the cost should a state conduct an action to the point any 
benefit the state wanted to gain would be negated. 
Those suggesting deterrence is not a viable strategy find issue with the principles 
and assumptions on which the theory is founded. From this camp, a general assumption 
exists that VNSA may not be deterrable when using a threat of punishment politically 
 
44 Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 
(April 2012): 22, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.665339. 
45 Freedman, Deterrence. 
46 Ibid., 26. 
47 T.V. Paul, “Complex Deterrence,” in Complex Deterrence Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 2. 
48 Ibid., 3. 
 
18 
feasible to the deterring state.49 Apart from the threat itself, there are hurdles the deterring 
state must surpass to convey a threat has even been made. For instance, a study released in 
2001 by DFI International concludes VNSA are difficult to deter because they are 
revisionist by their nature and assume a different risk calculus than states; VNSA will seek 
out violence rather than refrain from it because violence gains them greater notoriety.50 As 
well, the assumption of rationality becomes problematic when applied to the VNSA (as 
well as states), because there are a variety of views and motivations that make rationality 
non-universal—different actors consider what is valuable, differently.51 As well, David 
Auerswald acknowledges there is a lack of direct communication between the state actor 
and VNSA leading to indirect communication that results in ambiguity.52 Similarly, there 
is an apparent lack of common “deterrent culture” shared between the state and VNSA that 
would otherwise promote a common normative language that could lead to alternative 
actions other than violence.53 Furthermore, it is suggested a state’s use of deterrence may 
even invigorate a VNSA’s actions rather than prevent further violence. This may partly be 
because to the more commonly states use deterrence policies, the more likely VNSA will 
develop counter methods to create situations where the VNSA can gain notoriety or some 
other benefit.54 This maneuvering devolves into a situation where the state actor is left 
with no good options, what Adler refers to as a “deterrence trap,” to counter a VNSA’s 
activity other than through prolonged war.55 To counter such a trap, the previously 
mentioned DFI study suggests deterrence strategies involving the denial of VNSA’s 
objectives represent the most effective role for the U.S. military and further suggests 
 
49 Ibid., 15. 
50 “Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence of State and Non-State Adversaries: Potential Approaches and 
Prospects for Success,” Final Report (Washington, DC: DFI Government Practice, October 2001), 12. 
51 Freedman, Deterrence, 10. 
52 Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks, 551.” 
53 Adler, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era, 96.”; Freedman, Deterrence, 67. 
54 Adler, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era," 85. 
55 Ibid., 85–88. 
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interdiction operations, enhanced defenses, and an effective consequence management 
apparatus are key endeavors to denying VNSA from gaining benefits (objectives) from 
conducting attacks.56 Suffice to say, deterring VNSA by threatening punishment is a 
difficult and uncertain endeavor.57 
Despite the previous arguments which target the assumptions deterrence theory 
resides upon, there remain proponents of deterrence applicability against asymmetric 
VNSA. Many proponents have turned to criminological literature, which has made great 
strides in modifying deterrence theory into something perhaps more useful when 
considering VNSA. Overall, Daniel Nagin and Greg Pogarksy surmise there is a general 
agreement within criminal justice discourse regarding deterrence that the certainty of 
punishment provides a deterrent affect over that of the severity of punishment.58 Within a 
framework devoted to addressing criminal activity, a body of literature exists to identify 
ways to convey the costs associated with apprehension and punishment, at the individual 
and organization level, as an option to overwhelm any potential profit.59 Criminal 
deterrence is conveyed in two forms, with both attempting to make clear that “crime does 
not pay.” General deterrence seeks to educate and influence the population as a whole, 
while specific deterrence is targeted at the offender to deter them from further criminal 
acts.60 Regardless of the aforementioned consensus, critics question the efficacy, or at least 
the level of analysis as yet produced, of deterrence claims in this form, stating there are 
limited and conflicting understandings regarding human behavior (e.g., personal values 
 
56 “Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence of State and Non-State Adversaries: Potential Approaches and 
Prospects for Success,” 23. The study considers denial of operations, of coercion, and of objectives with 
each being possible, but the denial of objectives as the most feasible.  
57 David P. Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” 546. 
58 Daniel S. Nagin and Greg Pogarsky, “Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extra-Legal Sanction 
Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” Criminology 39, no. 4 (2001), 865. 
59 Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie, eds., The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (Thousand Oaks, 




and norms).61 Just as well, studies regarding the severity as well as the swiftness of 
punishment have suggested they too have an effect but remain “highly ambiguous.”62 
Terrorism and proliferation research has taken criminal deterrence findings to 
advance their claims. However, as Kroenig and Pavel articulate, deterrence is inadequately 
understood and underutilized in counterterrorism efforts, but it has great potential to stop 
future terrorist attacks.63 Attempting to unpack some of the deterrence mystery, Daniel 
Salisbury highlights potential sub-state deterrent methods targeting both individuals and 
organizations as a way to mitigate WMD-related illicit trade.64 Paul Davis and Brian 
Jenkins proposed reconsidering a VNSA organization as a whole and instead consider it as 
a complex system made of many parts that create and support it.65 Additionally, addressing 
the life-cycle of the terrorist process, from recruitment to assignment, may also impact the 
ability of the organization to continue.66 Looking at the individuals and their motivations 
within a terrorist network affords new deterrent options (a system of influences) that will 
potentially whittle away the terrorist organization’s ability to exist.67 As Davis and Jenkins 
 
61 Michael Tonry, “Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research,” Crime and Justice 37, no. 
1 (2008): 280. For example, A recent study suggested offenders may modify behaviors to decrease the 
likelihood of apprehension when deterrence measures are systematic, mitigating the temporal and spatial 
deterrent effects. See: Barak Ariel and Henry Patridge, “Predictable Policing: Measuring the Crime Control 
Benefits of Hotspots Policing at Bus Stops,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 33, no. 4 (December 
2017): 809–33. 
62 Daniel S. Nagin and Greg Pogarsky, “Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extra-Legal Sanction 
Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” Criminology 39, no. 4 (2001); Michael 
Tonry, “Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research,” Crime and Justice 37, no. 1 (2008); 
Daniel Salisbury, “Why Do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit 
WMD-Related Trade,” The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 3–4 (2017): 306, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1423718. 
63 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 22. 
64 Salisbury, “Why Do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit 
WMD-Related Trade, 297–314.” 
65 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, “Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A 
Component in the War on Al Qaeda” (RAND Corporation, 2002), 9. 
66 Ibid., 19. 
67 Ibid., 15. 
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ask, “Can al Qaeda be deterred? Of course not. But wait, what do we mean by that? If we 
ask, instead, whether the elements of the al Qaeda system [sic] can be deterred from doing 
specific things, the answer is ‘Yes.’”68 Thus, when faced with an asymmetric adversary, 
deterring a form of warfare may be a more productive endeavor than deterring the conflict 
altogether. 
However, even proponents of VNSA deterrence acknowledge there are limits to its 
effectiveness and lament it is unlikely all individuals can be successfully deterred. Davis 
and Jenkins generally categorize terrorist actors as either Type A or Type B.69 Type A 
terrorists include fanatics and pirates that are driven by violence itself. It is this type that 
the authors suggest must be eradicated. Echoing this, T.V. Paul acknowledges cataclysmic 
groups may not be deterrable at all.70 Type B terrorists describe those actors generally 
more pragmatic with political goals. They may act destructively but will revert to normal 
behavior once they achieved their goals. This type should be suppressed, but their concerns 
should be subsequently addressed.71 Although categorizing VNSA is useful for developing 
strategies to counter them, it is difficult to accept the premise there are actors only 
motivated by violence itself and the notions of suppressing and then addressing concerns 
is very compatible. Nevertheless, Kroenig and Barry suggest as long as some terrorism can 
be deterred, deterrence must be a part of a counterterrorism strategy.72 
Proliferation literature has taken criminal deterrence findings and applied them 
predominately to individuals and organizations along the supply-chain that wittingly or 
unwittingly support WMD proliferation. Similar to terrorism conclusions, non- and 
counter-proliferation literature categorizes individuals and entities into varying degrees of 
complicity. One such model by I.J. Stewart and Daniel Salisbury offers the “4 I’s:” 1) 
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Innocent—those actors that are unaware they have done anything wrong, 2) Ignorant—
those actors that do not understand controls regulating WMD-related material trade, 3) 
Indifferent—those actors that know they have done something wrong, but do not care, and 
4) Ideological—those actors that clearly know what they are doing is wrong either legally 
or morally and this fact may even drive them to act in this way.73 The model further 
identifies which type of deterrence method may be effective based on the individual’s or 
organization’s supposed “I.” The methods range from educating the innocent and ignorant, 
while the only method that may be available to deter the ideological is through denial of 
required technology, materials, and knowledge to develop WMD.74 Again, similar to 
terrorism conclusions, proliferation contends that there may be certain types of actors 
immune to any deterrent strategy, and suggests imprisonment or denial of export privileges 
as solutions.75  
Thus, the deterrence theory debate provides a wide swath of possibilities when 
applied to VNSA, both explored and untouched. While the application of classic deterrence 
appears limited, there is potential when considering a tailored approach that can penetrate 
the target organization at the individual or sub-component level. The notion that certainty 
of punishment has a deterrent effect in the criminological literature is notable, except CW, 
as with most proliferation, is normally conducted covertly making the ability to punish 
difficult.76 Likewise, the concept of punishment, certain or not, as a deterrence may not be 
overly relevant when targeting the determined terrorist or terrorist organization that already 
decided to pursue CW. Thus, there is a quagmire of questionable efficacy in completely 
deterring a terrorist organization or an individual terrorist as they may remain outside the 
reach of current deterrence efforts. What may be an alternative, is identifying useful 
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indicators that suggest a VNSA is primed to adopt CW and focus intelligence collection 
and counter-proliferation efforts to negate the VNSA’s ability to successfully do so. 
C. PUTTING THE VNSA CW THREAT INTO PERSPECTIVE 
Apart from the debate surrounding the effectiveness and utility CW possess at the 
state level, a separate debate surrounds whether the threat posed by a VNSA’s CW adoption 
and use is real or exaggerated. As Revill surmises, terrorists using CW in Syria and Iraq 
are a reality, but predicting VNSA adoption of catastrophic-level CW ignores several 
factors that influence the decision to adopt, much less to use them.77 Along this same vein, 
Philipp Bleek stated in a seminar one of his major concerns is not a VNSA using military-
grade CW, but a single actor attacking a victim by splashing acid across their face.78 Thus, 
it may not necessarily be whether the threat is real, but at what scale should a VNSA CW 
attack be expected?  
This discussion, as previously mentioned, turned a corner following the Aum 
Shinrikyo CW attacks in the mid-1990s.79 As both Ackerman and Jackson acknowledge, 
the literature suggested VNSA would rush to incorporate CW now that the precedent was 
set.80 To exemplify this swing towards the perceived existential threat, Gregory Koblentz 
highlights that in 2008 Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism predicted, “…it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass 
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destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”81 
However, as hindsight informs us, this prediction may appear to be something of a knee-
jerk reaction that attempted to generalize and provide broad conclusions founded on a 
handful of incidents that were unique to the Aum Shinrikyo case. As such, Meulenbelt and 
Nieuwenhizen observe that there has not been any substantial increase in VNSA CBRN 
incidents in recent decades.82 
In addressing various biases that may influence VNSA CBRN threat assessments, 
Gregory Koblentz aptly categorizes the schools of thought concerning the threat posed by 
VNSA acquiring WMD as either optimists, pessimists, or pragmatists.83 Koblentz goes on 
to state that each of the schools of thought drew their conclusions from the same CBRN 
terrorism data, but each developed their own conclusions. The optimists suggest CBRN 
terrorism is a “very low probability, very low consequence” threat; VNSA are not seeking 
a CBRN capability because they are not required to meet their objectives and will continue 
to prefer using conventional weapons.84 Koblentz suggests scholars that fall within this 
camp include Brain Michael Jenkins, Ehud Spriznak, and Milton Leitenberg. The 
pessimists consider CBRN terrorism is a “low (but growing) probability, high 
consequence” threat; the CBRN threat is growing due to VNSA changing intentions and 
increasing capabilities based on the democratization of science and technology.85 Scholars 
Koblentz suggests that fall within this camp include Richard Falkenrath, Ashton Carter, 
and Graham Allison. The pragmatists state CBRN terrorism is a “low probability, low 
consequence” threat; there is concern VNSA are showing a greater interest in mass casualty 
 
81 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN 
Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 501. 
82 Meulenbelt and Nieuwenhuizen, “Non-State Actors’ Pursuit of CBRN Weapons: From Motivation 
to Potential Humanitarian Consequences,” 833. 
83 Koblentz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism,” 
502. 




events and acquiring CBRN, but these cases are rare.86 Scholars Koblentz suggests fall 
within this camp include John Parachini, Jonathon Tucker, and Jean Pascal Zanders.87 
What is left unanswered is what each of the probabilities and consequences actually 
correspond to other than the scholar’s own interpretation. Despite using statistical jargon, 
there is no quantitative analysis providing a contextual backdrop. This missing information 
is not necessarily an omission made by Koblentz, but a result of the lack of data Koblentz 
could draw from. Much of the literature has thus far treated the relationship between VNSA 
and CBRN as if it were a similar issue as the relationship between states and nuclear 
proliferation. 
Just as well, regardless of which of Koblentz’s schools of thought appears to have 
a greater or lesser argument, that cases of VNSA exploring and using CW continue to 
materialize suggests the necessity of better analysis to inform policymakers and 
counterproliferation stakeholders on methods to deter and interdict those organizations 
seeking CW. As Ackerman, Bruce Hoffman, Christina Hellmich, and Amanda Redig 
argue, assessing the VNSA’s motivations, thought and decision-making process, and 
intentions to carry out attacks using CW must be done prior to assessing the true threat a 
VNSA poses.88 That is, analysis of the proclivity and capability a VNSA has must be 
conducted to inform probability and consequence conclusions. 
D. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES AND STANDING GUIDANCE 
As stated previously, the proliferation literature predominately focuses on methods 
to restrict states and VNSA ability to obtain WMD-related materials and technology from 
a supply side perspective. Such nonproliferation efforts based on monitoring and 
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investigating have been taken on by entities like the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is charged with implementing the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), a United Nations framework adopted in 1992.89 The OPCW is 
mandated to “…eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting 
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical 
weapons by States Parties.”90 Operating in concert with the OPCW, the Australian Group 
acts as a multilateral export control regime, dedicated to publishing controlled chemical 
and biological weapon precursors and associated dual-use equipment lists and monitoring 
exports and imports of chemical shipments.91 
The international community’s dedication to restricting the flow of CW and 
associated components has substantially impacted the availability of such material to 
aspiring CW developers, both states and VNSA.92 However, as Alley and Jones point out, 
the current nonproliferation regime remains focused on restricting those agents associated 
with traditional—military-grade—CW, which fails to control agents most utilized by 
VNSA.93 Despite these massive efforts, there remain indications terrorist organizations 
continue to plan operations using CW.94 In 2000, Matt Valiquette argued a counter-
proliferation strategy has become increasingly necessary and must be further developed 
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and actualized.95 Such a statement remains relevant more than 19 years later. Yet, with 
few exceptions, the literature finds the best way forward is to emphasize the vulnerability 
among the legitimate and illicit supply-chain networks and to promote the criminalization 
of its activity. Simply, James Wirtz posits, “Counter-proliferation addresses the ‘supply-
side’ of the WMD issue by reducing the availability of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons that might find their way into the hands of terrorists.”96 
In countering the supply-side of WMD, there appears a general consensus that  
illicit trade is the key factor in WMD development and more must be done to stop it. As 
David Albright et al. argue (regarding nuclear proliferation, but contend is relevant for all 
WMD), “The first line of defense is not currently adequate at deterring, catching, or 
prosecuting traffickers in dangerous nuclear goods.”97 Albright et al. continue with, “The 
international community must make countering illicit nuclear trade a bedrock of 
international nonproliferation efforts.”98 In their conclusion, they suggest making export 
controls universal, protecting facilities, improving illicit trade detection, increasing 
international organization investigatory capabilities, and expanding government and 
industry cooperation.99 
To complement the previous suggestions, in reference to the above 4 I’s, it is 
suggested continued efforts devoted to regulatory education and shaping international 
normative culture, through further chemical trade controls and improving ethical standards 
among chemists, could further restrict WMD material availability from entering illicit 
 
95 Matt J. Valiquette, “Assessing the U.S. Counter Proliferation Initiative: Considerations for Military 
Operations Other than War,” (Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), xii. 
96 James J. Wirtz, “Counter-Terrorism via Counter-Proliferation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
14, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 131–132. 
97 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, “Detecting and Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade 
after A. Q. Khan,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2010): 104, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01636601003673857. 
98 Albright, Brannan, and Stricker, “Detecting and Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade after A. Q. Khan,” 
104.  
99 Ibid., 95–101. 
 
28 
supply networks.100 Other policy options include increasing law and regulatory 
enforcement to deny those deemed undeterrable.101 Salisbury additionally contends there 
remains a need to “raise illicit WMD-related trade from the realms of ‘invisible crime’…” 
and further research into the illicit trade is required.102 
This sentiment is echoed by David Auerswald who acknowledged there are limits 
to deterring VNSA (as end-users) from WMD proliferation and suggests focusing on 
deterring, through denial or punishment, transnational organized crime groups (as likely 
intermediaries between legitimate trade and illegitimate end-users) as an option to 
restricting illicit trade supporting VNSA.103 Along a similar vein, Matthew Bunn and 
William Potter state that (nuclear) illicit trade “requires a whole-of-government approach 
combining intelligence, law enforcement, export controls, interdiction, customs, and 
financial controls.”104 Likewise in reference to nuclear WMD proliferation, Wyatt 
Hoffman and Tristan Volpe address the challenges posed by additive manufacturing 
technologies and suggest that additional regulations and monitoring may eventually be 
necessary to control the flow of dual-use or nuclear weapon component build packages.105 
Much of the work done aimed at further educating employees, increasing export 
controls, modifying acceptable normative behavior, and increasing cooperation among the 
various non- and counter-proliferation stakeholders continues to shed light on a topic that 
 
100 Stewart and Salisbury, “Non-State Actors as Proliferators: Preventing Their Involvement," 15.; 
Sydnes, Leiv K. “How to Curb Production of Chemical Weapons,” Nature 556 (April 2018). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Salisbury, “Why Do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit 
WMD-Related Trade," 297. 
103 Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks," 545–548. 
104 Matthew Bunn and William C. Potter, “Introduction: The Problem of Black-Market Nuclear 
Technology Networks,” in Preventing Black-Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 3. 
105 Wyatt Hoffman and Tristan A. Volpe, “Internet of Nuclear Things: Managing the Proliferation 




justly requires it. However, actions targeting the supply-chain will likely not be enough to 
stop determined VNSA from acquiring a CW capability.106 In the meantime, the 
“democratization of technical information, methodological approaches, and physical 
technology are making advanced science and engineering more accessible to non-specialist 
individuals.”107 Increasing access coupled with advances in dual-use technology and 
simplified methods, will make supply-chain monitoring and regulation increasingly 
challenging.108 This begs for a concerted effort to evaluate where the supply is headed and 
how it will be used. As Gary Ackerman and Markus Binder identify, appropriate planning 
to enhance counter-proliferation efforts cannot be accomplished if the threat environment 
is not understood.109 Without understanding what the threat is, how can the effects 
(regulation, deterrence, education, or norms development) of supply-chain policy be 
appropriately measured?  
Although there have been recent endeavors by Ackerman et al. to identify 
indications that can discern the likelihood a VNSA would adopt and use a chemical 
weapon, little research (although growing) exists that provides actionable direction to 
counter them.110 
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E. ADOPTION, MIGRATION, AND CONTAGION 
The foundation for this research takes into consideration three fundamental 
concepts: technology adoption, tactics migration, and contagion. Taking a page from the 
Technology Adoption Model (TAM) often seen in the commercial advertising and 
acquisition literature, Brian Jackson highlighted factors that could lead to VNSA 
successfully adopting new weapons.111 The factors are divided into two stages, with the 
first addressing those that influence decisions to innovate. Stage one factors include: 
• Technological awareness 
• Openness to new ideas 
• Attitudes toward risk*  
• The nature of the environment*112 
While the first two factors involve the psychological and philosophical nature of an 
organization and its key actors, the second two (with asterisk) can affect the demand to 
adopt based on various external pressures. External pressures could influence a VNSA’s 
ability to communicate, share material, and reconsider the appropriate level of risk. 
Stage two focuses on those factors that influence the successful adoption of 
technology, once the decision to innovate (Stage one) is made. Stage two factors include:  
• The nature of the technology 
• External communication links and the characteristics of technology 
sources* 
• The environment of the terrorist group* 
• Availability of financial and human resources* 
• Group longevity113 
Again, Stage two considers the environment along with other factors that are 
influenced by external pressure and how connected the organization is to the outside world. 
Thus, it is characterizing externalities that support CW adoption, a topic found in both 
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stages, that this research seeks to accomplish. In Jackson’s analysis of the impacts the 
environment has, he states VNSA contend with “pressures that lack an analogue in 
legitimate organizations. For example, the impact of law enforcement and counterterrorist 
forces, in addition to affecting operations that are underway, can have a significant effect 
on a group’s technology adoption process.”114 Although the stated external pressures may 
make it increasingly difficult for a VNSA to find the time and space necessary to fully 
develop new and effective weapons, could such pressures nevertheless prompt VNSA to 
try? Will pressure force a VNSA to develop a chemical capability in a similar fashion as 
witnessed by that same pressure forcing them to adjust tactics, techniques, and procedures 
regarding more conventional weapons? 
In concert with TAM, tactics migration theory literature such as Adam Dolnik’s 
book “Understanding Terrorist Innovation,” contends that many consider Aum Shinrikyo 
as “the most innovative terrorist organization of all time,” contributing that status primarily 
to the group’s psychological aspects such as an unyielding fascination for non-bloody—
but nevertheless terrifying—methods for causing mass casualties.115 However, there 
generally exist common external factors that affect a VNSA’s ability to innovate given a 
constant set of internal factors. As well, state sponsorship is sometimes attributed to an 
organization’s ability to innovate due to the two obvious advantages that come with such 
an alliance: increased ability to raise funds, and higher probability of access to critical 
information for technological or tactic development. Looking at the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), we see a well-funded organization provided by their narcotics 
business, which also leveraged expertise from the Colombian Navy and universities to 
design and build seaworthy semi-submersibles sometimes through financial incentive and 
other times through coercion.116 This ability to seek sources of knowledge outside their 
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organization helped them raise funds and therefore increased their operational 
effectiveness, however CW did not migrate through its alliance network of other VNSA.  
A VNSA’s cooperation with other organizations, as opposed to merely individuals 
with expertise, has shown to be a promising contributor to the organization’s probability 
of success in developing new technologies and tactics. For example, Al-Qaeda (AQ) 
training its affiliated groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI) has shown to migrate improvised 
explosive device (IED) tactics. Based on the researchers’ operational experience, this 
tactics migration included the utilization of multiple IEDs in tandem for maximizing 
casualties, as well as devices specifically designed to target first responders such as 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel, where a complex and compound initiation 
device does not detonate until certain neutralization procedures are attempted. The 
migration of mobile devices for sophisticated IEDs, such as dual-tone multi-frequency 
(DTMF) signaling that makes decoding signals more difficult without advanced electronic 
equipment, is yet another example of a migrating tactic resulting from VNSA alliances. 
These evolutions in tactics and technology are mostly incremental, which is the 
most prevalent scale of innovation in terrorist groups, despite academic researchers’ 
tendencies to focus on radical leaps of innovation.117 CW should be considered a radical 
leap considering that Aum Shinrikyo spent $30 million, of its estimated $1 billion in 
resources, solely to develop a Sarin capability on its own with negligible external 
collaboration.118  
 Complementing the communication and technological awareness concepts 
provided by TAM and tactics migration theory, among social network analysis (SNA), 
contagion theory delves more specifically into how actors influence others within the same 
network. Contagion theory seeks to explain “organizational members’ knowledge, 
attitudes, and behavior on the basis of information, attitudes, and behavior of others in the 
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network to whom they are linked.”119 It posits that one actor’s behavior influences 
another’s behavior to the degree that both actors have comparable relations to all the other 
actors within the network. Essentially, the measure of influence between actors is directly 
proportional to how similarly they are connected to the network.120  
Moving specifically to an organizational level of analysis, Palmer et al. contended 
during a study of U.S. corporations’ adoption of a multidivisional form (MDF) that, from 
an embeddedness perspective, “organizations are situated in networks of social 
relationships and adopt structures irrespective of efficiency considerations.”121 A 
conclusion suggested a corporation is more likely to adopt the MDF when they have ties 
with other firms that have already adopted MDF. Considering this finding with the 
overarching contagion theory, it is proposed that not only do tied organizations influence 
one another, but when it comes to the migration of a new technology, process, or, in our 
case, CW adoption, throughout an organizational network, a central organization must 
adopt it.  
Thus, for a new technology to successfully migrate in a dark network—a covert 
and illegal network—it may be important for a centrally placed actor within the network 
to adopt and act as a sponsor, though it does not necessarily need to be the first to do so.122 
Without the influence the centrally placed actor has, the new information and know-how 
will likely not be successfully distributed. This is particularly true among dark networks, 
which contend with pressures that inhibit a free flow of communication and a necessity to 
weigh operational security with the potential of interdiction by CT operations.  
 
119 Peter R. Monge and Noshir S. Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 174. 
120 Ibid., 176. 
121 Donald A. Palmer, P. Devereaux Jennings, and Eueguang Zhou, “Late Adoption of the 
Multidivisional Form by Large U.S. Corporations: Institutional, Political, and Economic Accounts,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 100, https://doi.org/0001-8392/93/3801-00100. 
122 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A 
Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., n.d.), xvii. 
34 
Therefore, considering the tenets provided by the TAM model and taking a 
demand-side approach at potential counter-proliferation efforts, it is surmised by analyzing 
the intensity of conflict—the environment—in concert with the inter-organizational 
alliance structure—the opportunity to proliferate—the results may reveal insights as to 
which VNSA are more likely to successfully adopt CW and which VNSA are better 











III. CONFLICT AND VNSA CW ADOPTION 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The data used to identify the impact conflict has on the likelihood a VNSA would 
adopt CW was collected from five pre-existing datasets: the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD); the Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN Use by Non-state Actors (POICN); the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset Global version 18.1 (UCDP 
GED); the POLITY IV Project Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–
2017; and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.123  
The GTD and POICN datasets were used to discern whether a VNSA CW attack 
was conducted in a particular country in a given year. Each dataset considers a CW event 
as a single observation and was thus transformed to discern whether CW was used in that 
country, in that year, providing a binomial dependent variable. Although GTD covers the 
years from 1970 to 2017, the years considered for this analysis were between 1995–2017 
because of the Aum Shinrikyo events, which propelled the idea VNSA may actually 
consider CW as a viable weapon. Prior to 1995, there were very few occurrences of VNSA 
use which could suggest it was either not readily reported in open sources or VNSA 
generally had not used them. 
Both GTD and POICN were used as references to ensure as much reporting on CW 
events were covered as possible. Although both were developed by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), each 
database fulfilled a particular requirement, thus leaving some disparities in their 
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observations. While GTD collected reported VNSA attacks, regardless of weapon used, 
POICN covered 1990–2017 and specifically looked at reporting for VNSA chemical and 
other WMD-type weapon events. However, POICN not only tracked CW use, but also 
included reports consisting of plots to use, threats to use, or failed use, for example. 
Therefore, this analysis only considered those events that actually occurred in POICN. 
Although most GTD and POICN events overlapped, there were a number that were 
reported in one and not the other. Therefore, a subsequent dataset was developed that 
merged GTD with POICN’s actual CW events, and removed any duplicated reports to 
create a streamlined dataset. 
The UCDP GED dataset was used to measure conflict and the estimated deaths 
resulting from that conflict. The UCDP GED unit of observation is “the ‘event’, i.e., an 
individual incident (phenomenon) of lethal violence occurring at a given time and 
place.”124 By tallying the type of violence and the resulting deaths in a country given a 
particular year, the resulting sum of the number of conflict events of a particular type 
provided a general conflict-centric intensity measurement, while the death sum provided a 
measure of lethality. The UCDP GED dataset divides the type of conflict into three nominal 
categories: 1) State-Based Conflict, 2) Non-State Conflict, and 3) One-Sided Violence.125 
UCDP GED defines State-Based Conflict as conflict involving a governing regime of a 
state against either another governing regime or an organized armed group (e.g., a terrorist 
organization).126 A Non-State Conflict is defined as “‘the use of armed force between two 
organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at 
least 25 battle related deaths in a year.’”127 One-Sided Violence is defined as “the use of 
armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians 
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which results in at least 25 deaths.”128 Also tallied was the count of years that a country 
did not experience conflict. Thus, a total of seven independent variables, based on a 
country-year unit of analysis were derived from the UCDP GED dataset.  
Last, the revised combined Polity Score, POLITY2, tracked by the POLITY IV 
PROJECT Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2017 dataset and the 
World Development Indicators tracking populations and GDP per capita (current US$) 
were used as control variables. The POLITY2 measure uses an ordinal scale between -10, 
depicting a full autocracy regime, and a +10, depicting a fully democratic regime.129  
Given the necessity to merge five separate datasets into a coherent and useful 
format, the open-source R Studio software was utilized to both combine and transform the 
data in a reproducible format.130 Each dataset was reduced to a sum of country-year 
occurrences to develop a common unit of analysis. As stated previously, the dependent 
variable, the occurrence of a VNSA CW event, was dichotomized to indicate a yes or no, 
or “1” or “0.” The independent variables consisted of the sum of events the particular 
dataset measured. To minimize the presence of extreme values, the UCDP GED conflict 
and death sums as well as the WDI variables were natural log transformed.  
In an effort to examine a cause and effect relationship, the independent variables 
derived from the UCDP GED dataset were lagged by one year. For example, the sum of 
conflicts in Brazil in 2001 were compared to the presence of a VNSA CW event in 2002. 
By offsetting the independent variable (sum of conflict) by one year, CW migration or 
adoption by VNSA may be better depicted as a result of conflict. Once the data was merged 
and transformed, this study used logistic regression to compare the dependent variable with 
the independent variables to assess potentially relevant associations. Additionally, for each 
of the independent variables, quadratic forms (and cubic for years of peace) were 
 
128 Ibid. 
129 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, “POLITY™ IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2017 Dataset,” 17. 
130 R Core Team, “R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing” (R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, 2013), http://www.R-project.org/. 
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considered to allow for non-linear relationships. The resulting independent variables are 
depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
Chemical Weapon Use? 
Country/Year (lag) Non-State Conflict (log) 
Country/Year (lag) State-Based Conflict (log) 
Country/Year (lag) One-Sided Violence (log) 
Country/Year (lag) Non-State Resulting Deaths (log) 
Country/Year (lag) State-Based Resulting Deaths (log) 
Country/Year (lag) One-Sided Violence Resulting Deaths (log) 
Country/Year Polity2 Score (measure of democracy) 
Country/Year Population (log) 
Country/Year GDP per capita (current US$) (log) 
Country/Year Count of Peace Years and quadratic and cubic 
 
B. MODEL RESULTS 
Six models were developed using the variables depicted in Table 1 with the results 
identified in Table 2. The first model incorporates all variables to provide an initial 
reference to compare with the subsequent models. Models 2 through 6 differentiated the 
lethality and the intensity of conflict while incorporating the conflict’s character (state-
based, one-sided, and non-state based). Variables shown to be insignificant (e.g., non-state-
based conflict) were removed in follow-on models to ascertain the strength of those 









Table 2. Model Results131 
VNSA Chemical Weapon Use? 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
Years of Peace 0.103 0.079 0.099 0.089 -0.050 -0.050 
 (0.148) (0.146) (0.148) (0.147) (0.150) (0.150) 
Years of Peace² -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.010 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Years of Peace³ -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.085*** 0.078** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Democracy² -0.009* -0.010* -0.009* -0.009* -0.010* -0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
State-Based Conflict 0.134 0.195**    -0.648
*** 
 (0.230) (0.085)    (0.219) 
State-Based Conflict²      0.146
*** 
      (0.035) 
Deaths from State-Based Conflict 0.053  0.147
** 0.142** -0.408**  
 (0.171)  (0.060) (0.060) (0.159)  
Deaths from State-Based Conflict²     0.073
***  
     (0.019)  
One-Sided Violence -0.044 0.198*    0.340 
 (0.203) (0.115)    (0.282) 
One-Sided Violence²      -0.034 
      (0.051) 
Deaths from One-Sided Violence 0.194  0.167
** 0.184** 0.109  
 (0.136)  (0.078) (0.074) (0.176)  
Deaths from One-Sided Violence²     0.008  
     (0.023)  
Non-State Conflict -0.147 0.067     
 (0.276) (0.094)     
Deaths from Non-State Conflict 0.125  0.037    
 (0.168)  (0.058)    
GDP per capita 0.470*** 0.467*** 0.476*** 0.464*** 0.493*** 0.475*** 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.089) (0.093) (0.094) 
State Population 0.528*** 0.516*** 0.531*** 0.537*** 0.545*** 0.508*** 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
Constant -16.778*** -16.378*** -16.838*** -16.824*** -16.768*** -15.855*** 
 (1.563) (1.513) (1.519) (1.513) (1.527) (1.524) 
Observations 3,494 3,494 3,494 3,494 3,494 3,494 
Log Likelihood -404.296 -406.449 -404.554 -404.752 -396.173 -397.458 




131 Table 2 produced using: Marek Hlavac, “Stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary 
Statistics Tables. R Package Version 5.2.2,” 2018, https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=stargazer. 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of each control variable (democracy, 
population, GDP per capita, and years of peace) remained relatively unchanged across each 
model. Across these specifications, Model 5 presents the lowest Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) score at 816.346. Since the AIC score is useful in comparing the models, 
with the lowest score indicating the best fit, Model 5’s AIC score proposes the lowest rate 
of prediction errors. As such, Model 5 suggests there is a statistically significant quadratic 
relationship between deaths from state-based conflicts and the probability of VNSA CW 
use, with a p-value of less than 0.01. This indicates there is a non-linear relationship 
between deaths resulting from state-based conflict and the probability of VNSA CW use, 
where there is a decreasing probability of VNSA CW at low levels of lethality and an 
increasing probability at higher levels of lethality. The inflection point appears at 
approximately 19 deaths in a country-year with a 1% probability of a VNSA CW attack. 
Therefore, low-lethality conflict shows a moderate mitigating effect on CW use while high-
lethality conflict significantly intensifies the likelihood of CW use.  
In comparison, Model 6 presents an AIC score of 818.915, yet measures the number 
of state-based conflict events (intensity) instead of the number of deaths (lethality) that 
Model 5 measures. Because Model 5’s AIC score suggests it is a better predictive model 
than Model 6, the number of deaths vice the number of conflict events is likely a better 
indicator when considering the probability of VNSA CW use. Thus, it may be the effects 
of conflict rather than the conflict itself that provides a useful indicator.  
Figures 1 and 2 display the coefficients for Model 1 (all tested variables) and Model 
5, the best fit. Figure 1 showcases the control variables and Figure 2 shows the key 
independent variables. In each figure, the dots set along the bars represent the model’s 
coefficients and the thicker bars represent the standard error. The longer, thinner bars show 
the 95% confidence interval. The shorter the bar, the more certain the coefficient. The bars 
that cross 0 indicate an insignificant relationship at the 5% level.  
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Figure 1. Control Variable Regression Coefficients 
 
Figure 2. Test Variable Regression Coefficients 
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As noted previously, Figure 1 shows the control variable coefficients were 
relatively unchanged across models. However, Figure 2 shows Model 5’s (in green) 
coefficients have a narrower 95% confidence interval, with State-Based Conflict Deaths² 
particularly narrow. The double asterisks indicate that Model 5 had the best fit with 
observed data. 
Figure 3 provides a visual representation for Model 5, particularly indicating the 
increasing probability of a VNSA CW attack at higher levels of lethality. The Y-axis 
reflects the probability of CW use by a VNSA. The X-axis depicts the independent 
variable, the lethality of conflict. The solid lines in the figures indicate the expected value 
of the dependent variable and the shaded areas around the lines depict the 95% confidence 
intervals.
 
Figure 3. VNSA Probability of CW Use: Deaths from State-Based Conflict  
As displayed in Figure 3, there is a minimal, slightly negative effect on the 
probability of VNSA CW use at the lowest levels of conflict lethality, as measured by 
deaths resulting from state-based conflict. This shifts to a slightly positive relationship at 
middle ranges of lethality (at approximately 19 deaths), then rises more rapidly for logged 
values higher than 8, which corresponds to approximately 2,980 deaths in a country-year. 
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Further analysis conducted on the effects that a state’s wealth, population, and 
democracy also provide revealing and provocative results. To summarize, a wealthier, 
more populated, and more democratic state—in conflict—is more at risk of a VNSA CW 
attack than a poorer, less populated, and more autocratic state. Figure 4 is provided as a 
graphic representation of the effect a state’s wealth has on the probability of a VNSA CW 
event.  
 
Figure 4. VNSA Probability of CW Use: Deaths from State-Based Conflict  
versus Wealth 
In a similar non-linear fashion as presented in Figure 3, Figure 4 presents a slightly 
negative slope in the lower levels of conflict lethality which pivots to a positive slope at 
the middle ranges equating to approximately 17 deaths. At 17 deaths, the probability shows 
of CW use is 0.2% at the lowest level of GDP per capita, while at the highest level of GDP 
per capita, the probability is 7%. As well, the wealthier states see a faster increase in 
probability than those at the lowest levels of wealth. Again, where the lethality value 
equates to a logged value of 8, the probability of CW use for countries at the lowest level 
of GDP per capita sits at approximately 1.8%, yet at the highest level of GDP per capita, 
the probability is approximately 36%. These findings could result from the increased 
44 
pressure a VNSA contends with to find capabilities to counter a military and policing force 
that is more likely better equipped based on the resources such a state possesses. However, 
further analysis on the relationships conveyed by these independent variables is warranted. 
C. INCORPORATING TIME-PHASED ANALYSIS 
The models thus far assumed CW migration from one environment to another 
remained constant from 1995 to 2017. This assumption would conclude the probability of 
a CW event based on a particular number of conflict events or deaths would remain 
constant regardless if it were 1995, 2017, or 2025. To depart from this assumption, a second 
set of models was constructed dividing up the years considered into four-year time periods 
(except for the last model, which included only the years 2015 to 2017). Using the same 
series of independent variables, Figure 5 provides the probability of a VNSA CW attack in 
each time period. 
 
Figure 5. VNSA CW Attack Probability in Four-Year Periods 
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Although this does not provide the perfect trend line, there is some evidence of an 
increase in probability over time, with all things being equal, which suggests that VNSA 
are now more inclined to turn towards incorporating a CW capability than they were in the 
past. This speaks to the importance investigating environmental pressures and demand 
signals when considering counter-proliferation policies targeting VNSA.  
D. ANALYSIS 
Based on the models, the analysis suggests state-based conflict and its effects 
impact the probability of VNSA CW use, with lethality presenting as a better indicator than 
intensity. This study proposes that there is a statistically significant and non-linear 
relationship between VNSA CW use and state-based deaths with an apparent threshold of 
approximately 19 deaths. Additionally, the analysis suggests a wealthier, higher populated, 
and democratic state has a higher probability of a VNSA CW attack than its opposite across 
all levels of lethality. Such findings may seem contrary to conventional thinking, especially 
considering the nearly two decades of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further research is 
needed to better understand this phenomenon. 
  Referring to the TAM model, this study appears to provide a telling variable that 
can usefully augment others when attempting to describe the environment that may induce 
a VNSA to consider CW use. It is suggested that a permissive environment may not be as 
necessary for a VNSA to develop a chemical capability, but the presence of conflict could 
adjust motivations to innovate and adopt new measures to continue fighting. A potential 
take-away proposes VNSA will adjust tactics out of necessity as its adversary adapts to the 
VNSA’s operational model. In other words, conflict forces innovation more so than peace. 
Such findings could be useful if adopted by U.S. counter-proliferation stakeholders and 
military planners. As conflict intensifies and results in a series of deaths, the necessity to 
adapt intelligence collection efforts towards identifying chemical agents within the 
battlespace may be prudent. This is particularly necessary given the evidence that suggests 
CW adoption is increasing over time. Such guidance could further support SOCOM’s 
counter-proliferation synchronization efforts, by ensuring DoD entities coordinate 
accordingly and are not left unprepared.  
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IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND DISRUPTION 
With a fundamental understanding of how certain environmental factors derived 
from a strategic context affect a VNSA’s likelihood of adopting and using CW, we now 
turn to how these tactics and technologies may transfer from one organization to another. 
Once we can estimate the likelihood that a single organization within an inter-
organizational alliance network would adopt CW, we can assess different strategies to 
disrupt potential migration through two types of operations: coercive direct action and 
information operations (IO).  
Relying on the mathematical and statistical models of social network analysis 
(SNA), analysts can map and identify methods to disrupt networks. This concept has been 
used to study illicit networks, gangs, drug cartels, and other “dark networks” among the 
same ilk. Following Sean Everton’s adopted definition, dark networks are those that 
operate covertly and illegally, “namely, any group that seeks to conceal itself and its 
activities from authorities.”132 Therefore, the analysis of alliances among terrorist 
organizations, and the organizations’ use of CW, falls neatly within dark network SNA.  
A. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS THEORY 
SNA may not itself be a prescriptive theory; it more closely resembles a set of tools 
resulting from a collection of theories and processes that can be used to provide insight into 
how networks consisting of individuals—or groups of individuals—interact and share 
information and materials.133 Through measuring a network’s topography and an actor’s 
perceived power or prestige within a network, conclusions can be derived as to where 
power, influence, strengths, and vulnerabilities lie within a network. One can exploit such 
conclusions to increase the productivity or robustness of an organization, or in our case, 
disrupt it.  
 
132 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xxv. 
133 Ibid., 5.  
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As with other analytical approaches, SNA relies on a set of assumptions which 
Everton compiled in a single list:134  
• Actors and their actions are interdependent vice independent of other actors 
• Ties between actors serve as avenues for the transfer of information and 
goods 
• Social structures are seen as enduring ties between actors 
• Continuous interaction among actors develop social formations which 
develop its own character that is both dependent and separate from the 
individual actors within the formation 
• An actor’s position in a network can influence that actor’s beliefs and 
actions 
• Social networks are not static, but change as actors join or leave the network 
Thus, SNA suggests that various relationships among actors can provide 
measurable avenues of influence, information, and goods while considering an actor’s 
location within a network as a determinant to the level of influence or access that actor has 
or can provide. In this and the next chapter, SNA will be used in conjunction with the 
Technology Adoption Model (TAM), tactics migration theory, and contagion theory 
discussed in Chapter II to provide a predictive intelligence tool for intelligence analysts 
supporting CP and other missions under special operations.  
B. TERMINOLOGY 
Among SNA researchers and practitioners, terminology can vary significantly with 
critical effects. Algorithms used to calculate various parameters to quantitatively describe 
a network can differ so much that the same term can have contradictory implications in 
disruption strategies. Therefore, we use terminology in Understanding Dark Networks 
 
134  Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14–15. 
49 
(Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 2016). The below offers an overview of network 
analysis statistics used in the following analyses.  
Average Distance is the average length of all of the shortest paths between all actors 
in the network. All things being equal, dark networks with relatively shorter average path 
distances may be able to diffuse information or materiel quicker than networks with longer 
average paths.135  
Diameter is the longest of all the short paths. A large diameter usually indicates that 
the network is decentralized, but it also implies that it takes longer for information to get 
from one node to the other.136  
Variance is the average of the squared differences between each actor’s centrality 
score and the mean average centrality score, which illustrates how centralized the dark 
network is. We use the normalized degree variance to compare differently sized networks. 
Furthermore, a high variance on degree centrality may mean that nodes have relatively high 
levels of access to each another, which would inhibit disruption.137 
Degree centralization shows the degree to which a network is centralized or 
decentralized. A high centralization score means that one or a few actors are relatively 
active (have a lot of ties) while other have very few ties.138  
Meanwhile, Degree Standard Deviation is the square root of the variance, consistent 
with standard statistical methods. This could also be interpreted as identifying how many 
actors are active in contrast to those that have fewer ties.139 For example, as we will see 
with the ETA network, a group of 5 actors all tied to one another is the likely culprit of 
 
135 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, & Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks (London: 
Roman & Littlefield, 2016), 86. 
136 Ibid., 86. 





driving up the standard deviation score due to the degree standard deviation algorithm; this 
is an artifact that analysts should be wary of since the analyst could unintentionally provide 
false impressions of higher centralization to the customer, thus altering the recommended 
disruption strategy.  
Normalized density also allows comparing networks of varied sizes to assess the 
total number of observed ties in a network divided by the total of possible ties, showing 
the level of interconnectivity for a dark network.140 
Average Degree is the measure formally defined as the sum of ties in a network 
divided by the number of actors in the network. This demonstrates how interconnected the 
network is, shedding light into potential trade-offs the network may have to make.141 
Compactness is a measure that identifies how interconnected actors are within a network 
on a scale from 0 to 1.142 When all actors are connected to all other actors, the network’s 
compactness is 1 and when no actors are connected, the measure is 0.  
A normalized clustering coefficient is the sum of each actor’s ties divided by the 
number of actors within the network, and it also indicates how interconnected a network is 
while highlighting potential trades a network may have to make.143  
Degree centrality counts the number of ties an actor has and could indicate how 
active the actor is, showing direct influence or power, or the ability to be influenced by 
others.144  
Closeness centrality is the average geodesic distance from an actor to every other 
actor, and can indicate how accessible other actors are and to the materials or goods.145 
 
140 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, & Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 87. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 





Betweenness centrality is how often each actor lies on the shortest path between all other 
pairs which indicates potential brokerage—gatekeepers.146  
Finally, eigenvector centrality weighs an actor’s centrality by the centrality scores 
of its neighbors, showing the level of indirect influence or power—potential social 
capital.147 
C. DATASETS 
To apply the theories laid out in the previous section to CW adoption at the 
interorganizational level, we assimilated data for this study from the same datasets as in 
Chapter III: the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); the Profiles of Incidents Involving 
CBRN Use by Non-state Actors (POICN). In addition, this chapter uses the Big Allied and 
Dangerous (BAAD) Database 1 to provide the alliance network data necessary to conduct 
SNA.148 In Chapter V, we introduce our network, the Myanmar-Affiliated VNSA (MAV) 
network, which we built using the open source Terrorism Research and Analysis 
Consortium (TRAC) database.  
The BAAD 1 database is an established network depicting 394 VNSA as nodes 
(sometimes referred to as vertices in graph theory) and a variety of relationships referred 
to as edges, links, or ties. We filtered the database to include alliances between 1998 and 
2005. The relationships–or edges–spanned from positive familial ties to negative or 
competitive ties. For this study, we only consider positive ties between VNSA.  
The GTD and POICN datasets helped discern which of the VNSA from the BAAD 
network used CW. Reported CW use by a VNSA in the BAAD network serves as an 
attribute for that node. Although the BAAD data only covered 1998–2005, GTD and 
 
146 Ibid., 145. 
147 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, & Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 144. 
148 Victor Asal, R. Karl Rethemeyer, and Ian Anderson, “National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Big Allied And Dangerous Database I” (University of 
Maryland, August 2009); “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism 
(START) Global Terrorism Database”; “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the 
Responses to Terrorism (START) POICN Database: CBRN Event Variables and Traits. Version 8.71.” 
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POICN referenced years 1995–2008 to discern which of the VNSA used CW. The 
additional three years on both ends of the BAAD timeframe rests on our assumption that 
CW adoption could transcend a set of alliances depicted by a finite timeframe. In other 
words, a network of alliances in 2005 would likely affect CW adoption in 2006. The only 
VNSA added for this analysis was the Haqqani Network; justified by the fact that it was 
active during 1998–2005, used CW, and aligned itself with al-Qaeda. 
The BAAD dataset supplied two unique inter-organizational alliance networks 
useful for comparative analysis. The first, the al-Qaeda (AQ) alliance network, illustrated 
a migration of CW TTP while the second, the Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 
alliance network, had only one group use CW and presented no migration. Next, we assess 
topographic and centrality measures for each alliance network. 
D. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. Topology 
Using ORA software to conduct SNA, we isolate the AQ alliance network from the 
rest of the BAAD dataset and color nodes with the CW attribute red, as shown in Figure 6. 
Table 3 illustrates important topological characteristics of the AQ alliance network. 
 
Figure 6. AQ Alliance Network (VNSA that have used CW are red) 
Table 3 illustrates important topological characteristics of the AQ alliance network 
to include centralization and density measures. We then repeat this process for the ETA 
alliance network in Figure 7 and Table 4. 
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Although the AQ alliance network is nearly twice the size of ETA’s, the 
topographic measurements are fairly similar. This is due to how nodes in each network 
connect. The most significant difference between the two networks is normalized variance. 
This measurement, as explained previously, depicts how accessible actors are to others. 
What may be doubling the normalized variance in the ETA alliance network are the five 
organizations that all share an alliance in a five-node clique, a feature that the AQ alliance 
network lacks. 
2. Centrality Measures 
In Tables 5 and 6, we compare centrality of AQ and ETA alliance networks. We 
list degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality scores. Because each 
measure illustrates similar trends with these two networks, we only display the sociograms 
in Figures 8 and 9 by sizing each node according to its individual degree centrality score, 







Table 5. Top 10 Organizations’ Centrality Measurements in the  
AQ Alliance Network 

































Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) 
0.084 









Ansar al-Sunnah Army 
0.366 
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) 
0.092 
Tawhid and Jihad 
0.212 
Ansar al-Sunnah Army 
0.072 




























Tawhid and Jihad 
0.356 
Ansar al-Sunnah Army 
0.051 




Figure 8. AQ Alliance Network, Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
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Table 6. Top 10 Organizations’ Centrality Measurements in the  
ETA Alliance Network 






17 November (RO-N17) 
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July 20th Brigade 
0.114 
Cooperative of Hand-Made 
Fire & Related Items 
0.341 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
0.132 
Cooperative of Hand-












































Figure 9. ETA Alliance Network, Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
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Across the centrality measures conducted in this analysis, AQ is clearly the most 
central organization, and thus has a prominent level of power within its network. 
Conversely, the ETA alliance network’s most central and powerful organization is the 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (RO-N17) and the ETA only rates fifth among 
the top organizations in betweenness. This suggests ETA is in a potential (but moderate) 
brokerage position but is not among the most powerful when considering these centrality 
measures. This offers a potentially powerful insight as to why CW use did not migrate in 
ETA’s alliance network while it did in AQ’s. Deriving from this analysis, a greater threat 
may have developed had RO-N17 adopted CW, for example. 
3. Brokerage 
ETA’s potential as a broker due to its moderate betweenness score warrants 
analysis of an additional measurement concerning brokerage. Below, Figure 10 depicts the 
brokerage potential each organization plays in their respective alliance network. This 
analysis measurement attempts to identify those nodes that are positioned within a network 
that bridge gaps between the network topography and may be best suited to assume 
brokerage potential.149 There are many ways to measure for brokerage potential, but we 
use the Burt’s Constraint here. This can measure a node’s “brokerage” ability in undirected 
networks by assessing how the overall network fractures when the node’s ties are severed; 
therefore, higher brokerage scores correspond to low Burt’s Constraint scores.150 Since we 
are considering organizations—rather than individuals—as actors, it may be difficult to 
presume an organization’s reach among a dark network would surpass much beyond the 
actors it is directly connected with. This means they can act as choke points for passing 
information and goods. It also means they may play key roles in fragmenting the network 
should they either be removed or cut relations with either side the actor connects. These 
features of the Burt’s Constraint will assist in analyzing effectiveness of simulated IO 
disruption later on. 
 
149 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A 
Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., n.d.), 170–183. 
150 Ibid., 182. 
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The graphics in Figure 10 show the smallest nodes as the least constrained, which 
are better positioned as a broker because they fill gaps within the network and connect 
different subgroups together. The larger nodes are more constrained and less capable of 
passing information or materiel across the network. As with the previous graphics, those 
organizations that have used CW are depicted in red. 
 
        AQ Alliance Network                                    ETA Alliance Network 
Larger nodes indicate higher Burt’s Constraint scores; Smaller nodes indicate higher 
Brokerage scores. 
Figure 10. Burt’s Constraint (Brokerage) Measurements 
As depicted in Figure 10, both AQ and ETA appear as relatively unconstrained, but 
AQ is less constrained than ETA. Thus, each organization is in a better position to perform 
as brokers within their respective alliance networks. Within the AQ alliance network, those 
organizations that adopted CW follow a path from AQ through other organizations that 
also act as brokers. This suggests AQ’s position within the alliance network, as a central 
node and well situated as a broker, supported CW migration.  
To the contrary, even with ETA presenting a relatively strong brokerage score, CW 
TTP did not migrate. This is likely due to its peripheral location within the alliance 
network. Although it may support concern that CW use could migrate towards the 
network’s periphery along those actors associated with ETA, the fact that ETA is not a  
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central organization and is thus presented as less aggressively pursuing alliances makes 
CW migration. These conclusions are in line with the psychological components of the 
TAM’s Stage One, which considers an organization’s technological awareness, openness 
to new ideas. Furthermore, one could argue that because AQ is objectively seen as a well-
known, influential actor (by those in and out of its alliance network), some of its adjacent 
nodes may have followed AQ’s lead in pursuing CW TTP if they were adequately tied to 
it (had access to requisite knowledge and resources) because they saw their prestigious 
“mentor” organization do so. 
E. DISRUPTION MODEL 
There are numerous ways to evaluate different disruption strategies without having 
to conduct actual operations on a real-world network. In this chapter, we implement a basic 
Actor-Based Model (ABM) for the AQ network with simple, turn-based decision points 
using a list of assumptions to simplify the model for feasibility of implementation on a 
small scale. In Chapter V, we automate parts of the model and refine it for a specific case 
study. In this chapter, the basic model’s friendly actors will initially know limited 
information about the network; but, as the model progresses and each actor conducts its 
unique actions, knowledge of the network will grow as will the CW tactics attribute 
throughout AQ’s affiliates. 
1. Actor-Based Model 
In this ABM, the adversarial “actors” (and network nodes) are the VNSA, which 
we assume to be a terrorist organization that are either CW-capable or not, indicated by red 
and blue nodes. Black nodes are organizations which friendly forces do not yet know if 
they are CW-capable are not. We assume that the CW capability will spread from AQ (the 
most central node with well-developed CW capability from a decades-old program) by 
approximately 5% for each turn. We select this diffusion rate based on time-series data 
from GTD and POICN of CW diffusion throughout Middle Eastern, South Asian, and 
South-East Asian regions. By tallying up the number of unique organizations in these 
regions from the combined GTD and POICN database, we plot the cumulative number of  
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CW-capable organizations and see a linear trend from 2008–2017 with an R-squared value 
of 0.9804. Figure 11 and Table 7 illustrate approximately 5% diffusion, which we will use 
in the ABM. 
 
Figure 11. CW-Capable VNSA in Middle East, South Asia, and  
Southeast Asia: 2008–2017 
Table 7. Year-Over-Year Increase of CW-Capable Organizations in Central 


















This diffusion rate could correspond to a network’s node with 20 ties, which would 
have 1 adjacent node that gains CW capability after each turn. Using a uniformly 
distributed pseudorandom number generator in MATLAB® Version R2019(a) with the 
random (rand) function, we choose the node to gain the CW capability (attribute). If a 
node chosen by the function happens to already exhibit the CW attribute, then the same 
process is conducted for that second-tier node at a diffusion rate of 5% for its adjacent 
nodes. If the second-tier node has less than 10 edges, then no further tactics migration 
occurs. For example, with the 33 nodes surrounding AQ, about 1.6 adjacent nodes (rounded 
up to 2) will gain the CW attribute. One of those secondary nodes has 12 adjacent nodes 
tied to it. If the rand function used on the next time-step choses a secondary node, one 
node (12 x 5% = 0.6, rounds up to 1) chosen at random will gain the CW attribute. The 
node(s) chosen to gain the CW attribute will be also based on the same random function 
by assigning each adjacent node an integer, and multiplying the result of the pseudorandom 
function by the maximum value (i.e. 33), the product (rounded to the nearest integer) from 
which will correspond to the node chosen to gain the CW attribute.  
Another type of actor is the counter-proliferation (CP) force. For this model, CP 
forces include any operational unit of action (conventional, SOF, or Cyber/IO) tasked with 
(or to support) a CWMD mission in accordance with higher headquarters’ guidance. In 
pursuit of inhibiting CW diffusion, CP forces are able to carry out either:  
(a) Coercive operations, which disrupts TTP migration in the network by 
removing the CW attribute from a VNSA (node), or  
(b) Information Operations, which breaks a tie between two or more nodes.  
Coercive CP actions can include physical destruction (via conventional or SOF 
assets) of precursor agents or CW, or even a diplomatic, public affairs, economic, PSYOP, 
or any other activity that deters the VNSA from using CW. On the other hand, an IO CP 
action involves cutting ties by conducting offensive cyber operations (OCO) targeting the 
lines of communication between two or more actors, physical destruction of 
communications infrastructure, disinformation propagation, instilling distrust between 
allies, or other IO capabilities. In the case of coercion, the CP force will target the node(s) 
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with highest degree centrality. For IO, CP forces target the tie(s) connected to nodes with 
the highest brokerage scores (lowest Burt constraint scores).  
The third actor type is Intelligence assets (INTEL), which are only able to 
“monitor” three VNSA at a time within the AQ network due to “budgetary constraints and 
limited personnel resources” for CT and CP missions against non-state actors. Monitoring 
a node assumes that approximately 50% of its directly affiliated terrorist groups (adjacent 
nodes) with unknown CW capability status will be discovered after each time-step (where 
“discovered” will be indicated by turning a black node either blue or red, depending on its 
CW status after tactics migrated from the previous step). The fortunate caveat for INTEL 
is that they are able to monitor one more tie for each IO disruption, if the tie is between 
one known and one unknown VNSA. This assumes that when Cyber assets conduct an 
OCO, or IO forces spread disinformation, INTEL then has the ability to collect Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) from that tie between two nodes to “listen in” or to track the 
disinformation diffusion. Finally, if INTEL is monitoring every tie coming out of a node, 
then they are able to detect whether the VNSA is CW-capable or not, otherwise each turn 
yields the standard 50% probability of determining such information based on the number 
of ties leading to still-unknown nodes. The limitations of this model include the fact that 
the VNSA network is not really adapting to INTEL or CP actions, although the probability 
of CW tactics migrating to certain nodes does increase as ties are cut, which could infer 
second- or third-order effects detrimental to CWMD efforts. The INTEL mechanism will 
only be used in this chapter, and not the case study in Chapter V. 
The objective in this simulation straddles the operational and strategic levels of 
irregular and information warfare. In our case, the objective is to utilize coercive direct 
action (kinetic or non-kinetic) and IO to disrupt the AQ network’s CW TTP migration, in 
order to deter Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) from adopting CW. In one model we will only use 
IO (cutting ties) and in the other we will only use coercive direct action (turning red nodes 
to blue), within the context of the previously described ABM. 
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2. Model Time-Steps: IO Disruption 
In Figures 12 and 13, on the left side, the full network and the CW-capability 
attributes are shown in blue and red. On the right side for each time-step of the model, we 
see what INTEL and CP “sees:” black nodes for VNSA with an unknown CW-capability 
status, blue with those that are not CW-capable and red with those that are. The text on the 
far right indicates which actions each actor takes for the next time-step based on the above 
assumptions. Initially, we are only aware of two organizations’ CW capability statuses, 
HAMAS (left red node) and AQ (right red node). Because it is extremely difficult to 
effectively conduct CP on organizations as large as AQ, and politically sensitive as 
HAMAS, the first turn’s actions only consist of IO and (as for every turn) intelligence 
collection. In an attempt to reflect the OPS/INTEL coordination cycle, the actors’ action 
descriptions will appear in order of INTEL, Operations, and finally the adversary’s CW 
tactics migration. The order would affect probabilities for each dependent variable within 
the model. Because each individual outcome is probabilistic, this model demonstration 
lacks robustness to provide stochastic results. Chapter V’s case study will introduce these 
features to the model, but here we only look at one possible model trajectory. If the model 
was implemented again with the same parameters, there would likely be a slightly different 
outcome in terms of which VNSA adopt CW and which are surveilled by INTEL. 
Nevertheless, the example presented here demonstrates a framework with which CWMD 
OPS/INTEL fusion centers can work together using these analytical methodologies in 
support of CP.  
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Figure 12. Model Time-Steps 0-2: IO Disruption 
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Figure 13. Model Time-Steps 3-4: IO Disruption 
Here, we saw HM became isolated after four time-steps using only IO where we 
removed ties as intelligence was gathered on the inter-organizational network, and CW 
tactics migrated from those VNSA that were initially CW-capable. Next, we compare these 
results to coercive operations using the same intelligence capabilities and CW diffusion 
rates. 
3. Model Time-Steps: Coercive Disruption
In Figure 14, the sociograms show time-steps and actions that reflect network 
changes as the CP assets (SOF, in this case) conduct coercion operations to remove a CW 
program as an attribute of an individual VNSA. This would correspond to direct action on 
a crucial facility or scientist, disposal of critical precursor or manufacturing materials, EOD 
operations on chemical munitions inbound to the VNSA, or economic sanctions on the 
VNSA’s critical state sponsor resulting in effective deterrence. It could also include 
HUMINT source operations in which an organization’s agent is tasked to sabotage the CW 
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program in some way. Coercive disruption also includes conventional operations involving 
standoff munitions eliminating a critical facility or individual, or cyber operations that 
directly attacks the node (renders a CW program ineffective) as opposed to the tie between 
nodes.  
We begin the simulation with the same parameters and probabilities as the IO 
simulation, and because it would be unrealistic to completely remove AQ’s CW capability, 
the first coercive disruption action will be on the other organization initially known to be 
CW-capable: HAMAS.  
Figure 14. Model Time-Steps: Coercive Disruption 
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Because some critical ties between AQ and other nodes with high brokerage 
remained intact, it was only a matter of time before HM adopted CW tactics from the highly 
central node. Therefore, CP efforts failed after only two turns in deterring HM. It is 
important to note that CW tactics did not spread throughout the nodes in vicinity of 
HAMAS due to its early elimination, as well as those nodes around LeT. One can conclude 
from intuition and this simulation that it is effective to contain tactics migration to just a 
few nodes by eliminating the threatening attribute from the most central of nodes carrying 
that attribute. However, to prevent a specific node from gaining that attribute, it is more 
effective to reduce the ties to that target node. This disparity between IO and coercive direct 
action highlights the necessity to emphasize Commander’s Intent when deciding strategies 
and certain combinations of CP tactics. 
Running the pseudorandom number generator 1,000 times in a basic Monte Carlo 
simulation (see Appendix A for MATLAB Code), we obtain a histogram in Figure 15 that 
shows the distribution of the frequencies of 3 adjacent nodes obtaining CW tactics based 
on the prescribed diffusion rate of 5%. This process was repeated for 5% diffusion to 
secondary nodes, and 50% diffusion for intelligence collection. In future works, regression 
analysis could better fine tune these values to improve the actor-based model. The 
histograms in Figure 15 also illustrate the Monte Carlo simulations for how many times 
CW migrated to AQ’s adjacent nodes using no, coercive, and IO disruption, respectively. 
In coercive disruption, one-third of AQ’s adjacent nodes were effectively “coerced” 
(stayed zero regardless of AQ’s efforts), and in IO disruption, one-third of AQ’s ties were 
“disabled” (one-third less probability of CW diffusion). 
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Figure 15. Number of Times CW Migrated to AQ’s Adjacent Nodes for No Disruption 
(left), Coercive Disruption (center), and IO Disruption (right) 
From these histograms, we see that at these diffusion rates, IO is slightly more 
effective than coercion (CW migrated 2.121 times on average under IO influence versus 
2.247 times under coercion, although they do each lie just outside their margins of error). 
IO practitioners and CP operators understand that using coercive methods to completely 
remove the CW capability (often through kinetic action) or intent (often through non-
kinetic action) is much more difficult than using (at least certain forms of) IO disruption to 
sever communications between two actors. Therefore, to effectively coerce one-third of 
AQ’s allies with certainty that they either cannot or will not adopt or use CW is not very 
realistic. Instead, we assess the model’s results from the same network with its CW 
diffusion characteristics as before, but this time only effectively coercing two nodes tied to 
AQ. For comparison’s sake, we run IO disruption cutting only 2 of AQ’s 33 ties and show 
the results in histogram format in Figure 16. The histograms from this scenario show that 
IO is again slightly more effective, although this time it lies within each plot’s margin of 
error. Nevertheless, given that IO actions are often easier to use against a wide net of targets 
than coercive actions in the scope of CP of chemical programs, it is more useful to compare 
approximately two nodes coercively deterred against approximately one-third ties 
disrupted using IO. 
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Figure 16. Coercive Disruption against Two Nodes (left) and IO Disruption  
against Two Ties (right) 
Considering these results in the context of current events illustrating the 
simultaneous rise of peer adversaries and terrorist groups using CW as real and persistent 
threats, along with major paradigm shifts of CWMD responsibilities in the DoD and 
interagency organization yielding further resource constraints, there exists an urgent need 
to intelligently approach how we counter CW use. Ideally, coercion—kinetic and non-
kinetic—and IO remain proficient irregular warfare options against CW-capable VNSA 
and regain the capability to counter China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, with 
limited personnel, access, equipment, and funds, there are better ways to counter the often-
elusive VNSA CW program. 
By understanding the TAM and how organizations seek and implement new 
technologies and tactics (demand side), we can better predict which organizations may 
pursue CW and which strategic environments could serve as catalysts for CW programs. 
Next, we must have fundamental knowledge of tactics migration theory and acquire 
reliable intelligence on how VNSA are tied together in inter-organizational networks. 
Then, we use contagion theory to identify which organization-level nodes may serve as 
better diffusers of technologies and tactics. 
Only once we understand the applicability of these relevant theories within the 
context of dark networks and nonconventional weapons development can we implement 
social network analysis methods. By assessing how central a VNSA is within its alliance 
network, or how much it acts as a broker, we can estimate how particular actions may affect 
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a targeted network. Finally, by applying the custom actor-based model, we simulated those 
actions with negligible cost and consequence to evaluate different strategies and 
implementations of coercion (SOF/conventional) and IO actions to target nodes and ties, 
respectively. While each operation type has advantages and disadvantages, it appears that 
from these preliminary results, IO better serves to isolate organizations from tactics 
migration with the reduced risk inherent in loss of life. Policymakers and commanders 
should heed these results in campaign planning, as the tactical and operational decisions 
made by analysts and operators alike will have globally strategic effect whenever chemical 
weapons are involved. 
In the next chapter, we see how a team of operators and intelligence analysts can 
work together in a notional (fictional, but realistic and based on some open source data) 
case study in which there is initially little presence in theater, increasing violence in a 







V. CASE STUDY: MYANMAR VNSA ALLIANCE NETWORK 
The continuous DoD/IC presence in areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 
has resulted in a developed analytic foundation that is atypical for most low intensity 
conflicts conducted by SOCOM units around the globe. Furthermore, as discussed 
previously, violent extremism disregards political boundaries as does the proliferation of 
WMD technologies and tactics, especially CW. Since CP operators and analysts cannot be 
expected to maintain a presence in every region experiencing a crisis that could possibly 
contain CW, there exists a need to quickly set up predictive intelligence models that can 
provide rough estimates of TTP migration to policymakers. While select analyses already 
exist on information transfer within an organization, this chapter continues with the 
methods of assessing how TTP (CW capability in particular) migrate through an inter-
organizational network by using a notional case study based on the actual VNSA alliance 
network centered in Myanmar. 
Myanmar presents a useful case study scenario for multiple reasons. First, there is 
little U.S. or Coalition presence in the country, so the effort inherent in building a predictive 
model based on limited data resembles the level of effort (in terms of resources needed to 
deploy to theater) necessary to successfully conduct CP at the cusp of tactical and 
operational levels of warfare with strategic implications.151 Second, violence levels and 
political unrest have increased dramatically over the past few years due to Myanmar’s 
security forces’ and VNSA continued use of violence and human rights violations, 
particularly against the Muslim Rohingya population in the Rakhine State.152 Third, there 
exists a major disconnect with the country’s military junta and the democratically elected 
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government that results in a quasi-shadow government.153 Indeed, Myanmar’s praetorian 
state—a political system in which “civilians serve in [a] government at the pleasure (and 
by permission) of the army”—is still alive and well despite the surge in publicity and 
governing power received by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy 
(NLD) party.154 The systemic, nationwide poverty also contributes to instability as one of 
the three poorest countries in Asia with an average monthly income of $300 and 37% of 
its 53.4 million population at or below the poverty line.155 In addition, the military junta 
has likely continued ties with rogue, adversarial nations like North Korea, and potentially 
is still coordinating arms sales to include WMD-related technologies despite the 
government denying such relationships.156 Finally, the demographics create a fertile 
ground for ethno-religious conflict, as Myanmar is considered one of the world’s most 
heterogeneous societies with 135 officially recognized ethnicities, each with their own 
culture, history, and language.157  
The accusations of CW development in Myanmar includes suspected storage 
facilities from investigative journalists, reported CW-related symptoms among military, 
civilians, and agriculture by watchdog non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other 
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open source reports, as shown in Figure 17.158 Given Myanmar’s current social 
environment coupled with reliable accusations of CW sales, tests, and technology transfers, 
this case study will assess how CW proliferation could occur among VNSA within the 
country and among VNSA allegedly aligned with groups in Myanmar such as the case 
depicted in Figure 17.159   
 
Figure 17. Suspected CW Production Facility in Magwe Region, Myanmar 
A. SCENARIO 
1. Notional, Realistic Scenario 
While SOCPAC continues enduring SOF missions in the Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and elsewhere, civil unrest from violent extremism in Myanmar has increased 
significantly to the point of genocide and spiraled into a regional crisis due to the vast 
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emigration and resulting human and economic strains. USINDOPACOM tasked SOCPAC 
as Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force—Myanmar (which will subsequently 
be referred to as JSOTF-M) to combat ISIS, AQ, and affiliated groups operating within the 
country. In order to stabilize the country, provide humanitarian assistance, and increase 
U.S. influence, JSOTF-M is tasked as the supported commander to conduct limited IO and 
CT operations against certain VNSA that pose a threat to the civilian population and U.S. 
strategic interests. Furthermore, JSTOF-M is tasked to be prepared to conduct CP 
operations due to (notional) intelligence that North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, and VNSA 
like ISIS and AQ have supplied certain organizations within Myanmar with manufactured 
and crude chemical weapons and chemical agent precursors. Secondary strategic concerns 
include Myanmar’s oil and mineral reserves and its role as a trade route for China to the 
Indian Ocean without needing to transit through the Straits of Malacca or Singapore. 
2. Objective 
To conduct an adequate intelligence preparation of the operational environment 
(IPOE), a small SOJ2/SOJ3 Ops-Intel CWMD Fusion Cell under JSOTF-M must leverage 
the scarce HUMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT capabilities (as well as CP operational assets) 
that are available to combat the proliferation of manufactured and crude CW. To that end, 
the SOJ2 initiates an effort to conduct SNA involving the inter-organizational VNSA 
network, dubbed the Myanmar-Affiliated VNSA (MAV) Network, consisting of 
organizations and state sponsors that are either already known to possess CW capabilities 
or have direct ties to organizations or states that do. Then, using simulations presented 
below, we assess whether it is more effective to cut ties between significant VNSA through 
information operations (IO) or conduct coercive direct action (kinetic or non-kinetic) CP 
operations that remove CW capabilities from a single organization in the MAV network. 
This type of coercive direct action could target a VNSA (the “node”) by destroying CW 
storage and manufacturing facilities, offensive cyber operations (OCO) against CW 
facilities’ infrastructure to disable certain processes, economic/diplomatic efforts, or covert 
actions that would render successful CW attacks highly unlikely or ineffective (or deter the 
VNSA’s intent of such an attack). Direct action could also incorporate SOF or conventional 
assets to meet tactical objectives. On the other hand, IO activities target ties between VNSA 
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and include cyber, PSYOPS, or other MISO actions between organizations to spread 
disinformation or distrust, or even kinetic actions that target communications 
infrastructure, all with the intent of disrupting or distorting the flow of communication (and 
therefore the transfer of CW TTP). 
3. Dataset 
The Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) combines research 
efforts from 2,800 regional and topical experts reporting from hotspots around the globe, 
and its database offers open source information on VNSA, their affiliates, and the tactics 
used.160 For this case study, we focus on all VNSA either predominantly operating in—or 
headquartered in—Myanmar, as well as VNSA and state sponsors that have direct ties with 
at least one Myanmar-based VNSA. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the organization, 
which includes VNSA and states as nodes. Positive ties (+1) include relationships that, 
using TRAC’s terminology, are allies, affiliates, armed/military wing, political wing, 
inspired by, descendant, and other similar phrases. Rivals and enemies describe negative 
ties (-1), which we dichotomize in the SNA process to equal zero. All ties are unweighted 
such that a strong ally has the same value of connection as a loosely affiliated group. For 
the analysis, VNSA without a tie are removed. 
B. MAV SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The overall MAV network (excluding isolates) sociogram presents several clusters 
as shown in Figure 18. One cluster contains Iran, PRC, Russia, DPRK, and the former 
Myanmar Military Junta, all of which have a CW capability (either allegedly or self-
proclaimed). The densest cluster, located on the right side of the graphic, consists of the 
different brigades and other extremist groups tied closely to the Junta. The primary cluster 
is centered around AQ near the middle, as the following centrality measures show. Finally, 
the bottom cluster is centered around ULFA and UNLF (see Appendix C for MAV 
organization names). 
 




Figure 18. MAV Alliance Network (VNSA that have used CW are Red) 
1. MAV Topology 
Tables 8 and 9 show the same topology statistics for MAV as previously calculated 
for the AQ and ETA alliance networks. In the list of top 10 organizations in terms of 
centrality metrics, red groups are those that allegedly have CW capabilities. The MAV 
network’s centrality measures suggest it closely resembles the AQ alliance network but 
shares a similar normalized variance as the ETA alliance network. The density measures 
show the network is denser than the previously analyzed AQ alliance network. This 
suggests the MAV network is fairly more hierarchical and denser than the AQ alliance 
network. One could interpret that information and material would transfer more efficiently 
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from one group to another among MAV alliances but may be slightly more vulnerable to 
the removal of a handful of critical actors.  
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Table 9. Top 10 Organizations’ Centrality Measurements 
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Unsurprisingly, AQ and DPRK consistently present near the top of the centrality 
measurements. ULFA and HUJI/Burma (and other HUJI groups, which are all in the same 
clique) also display consistently high centrality. In Figure 19, we see nodes sized according 
to degree centrality, since the other measures show similar results as was the case with the 
AQ alliance network. 
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Figure 19. MAV Alliance Network, Nodes Sized by Degree Centrality 
2. MAV Brokerage 
Next, as with the AQ and ETA networks, we assess brokerage using the Burt 
constraint. This measure will again directly support IO planning in preventing the 
migration of CW TTP during the simulations. In the Burt constraint sociogram shown in 
Figure 20, the smallest nodes are least constrained and therefore better brokers of 
information and material by filling openings within the network that would otherwise 
remain disconnected. Larger nodes are most constrained and therefore poor candidates for 
brokers due to a lack of well-connected nodes tied to them. Red nodes are those with CW 
capabilities. Running the Burt constraint function in ORA, and confirmed in UCINet, AQ 
and ULFA present as the best potential brokers in the MAV alliance network. 
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Figure 20. MAV Alliance Network, Nodes Sized by Brokerage  
C. ACTOR-BASED MODEL 
1. Model Assumptions and Characteristics 
For this case study, and to simplify the ABM by omitting the “INTEL” actor, we 
assume intelligence assets have the full operational picture to detect whether or not every 
group being assessed has a CW capability in contrast to Chapter IV in which the CW status 
was unknown for some groups until intelligence reported the status. However, we capture 
the rate of intelligence collection as variable where more capabilities are determined early 
on in the simulation (upon initial IPOE) and less is determined per year as the conflict 
progresses. This concept is further explained in the following section. Next, we assume 
once a VNSA gains a CW capability, they retain it for the full duration of the simulation. 
We also assume CW TTP migration only occurs each year by one degree, meaning that a 
certain percentage of tied organizations to a CW-capable organization will gain the CW 
attribute, but it will not migrate past that point. This serves as a realistic assumption since 
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it takes time for an organization to receive a technology and eventually adopt it 
successfully, especially if VNSA are constrained from US/Coalition CP efforts. Finally, 
we assume ties do not change throughout the simulation. With IO disruption, we will 
change the initial ties from the original MAV network, but the total number of ties will 
remain constant throughout each subsequent time-step. 
2. Chemical Weapons TTP Migration 
The constant CW TTP diffusion rate for each simulation will again manifest 
through non-exclusive pseudo-random selection of VNSA tied to CW-capable VNSA. This 
produces a natural logarithmic accumulation of CW-capable VNSA since some selections 
made from the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) will sometimes already be CW-
capable due to a previous PRNG iteration of CW spreading or initial conditions. In Chapter 
IV, we obtained a diffusion rate from observations for organizations that are not necessarily 
in the same networks and could in fact be of rival or enemy networks. The resulting linear 
trend from the region-specific GTD/POICN dataset does not account for imperfect 
intelligence of the environment and actors within the theater. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that initially, as intelligence assets work to develop the environment, their account 
of CW-capable organizations increases rapidly and levels out after several years in theater 
while CW TTP continue migrating at a near-linear rate (based on historical data). This 
assumes that there is no significant increase in conflict levels and other factors that would 
change the strategic environment during the simulation (i.e. “Black Swan” events). These 
assumptions of relatively consistent conflict levels and the near-asymptotic nature of 
intelligence gathering upon initiating a campaign is captured in the algorithm used to 
simulate the ABM through nonexclusive pseudorandom selections when determining 
which nodes adjacent to a CW-capable node gain the CW attribute. Some selections will 
be of adjacent nodes that already hold the attribute, just as intelligence collected on an 
organization showing CW development will sometimes be latent information if the 
capability was captured in an earlier intelligence report. 
 
81 
Therefore, instead of importing raw numbers for an entire region, we must now 
import the year-over-year increase of CW-capable VNSA within an interorganizational 
network, such as the AQ alliance network. In this case, we include the GTD and POICN 
data, updated with well-known organizations from TRAC not already included in BAAD 
1, but filtered to only include those VNSA that are AQ affiliates. In doing so, we show inf 
Figure 21 that a natural logarithmic function can describe the time-series cumulative plot 
below with an R-squared value of 0.9947. Next, we run the algorithm with different 
diffusion rates in increments of 5% up to 30% and plot the results in Figure 22 to assess 
which may be suitable candidates for the simulation. 
 
Figure 21. CW Diffusion in AQ Network 
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Figure 22. MAV Network Cumulative Plot of CW Groups  
Using Varying Diffusion Rates 
Due to the algorithm’s randomness, the complexity of how VNSA interact, 
psychological factors of leaders deciding to adopt CW, and the logistics and security issues 
with transferring technologies and tactics in constrained, non-permissive environments, 
there is a stochastic nature to this simulation. Thus, we assess each diffusion rate over 1000 
iterations in Monte-Carlo simulations to obtain mean values of CW nodes and plot the 
results in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. MAV Alliance Network Cumulative Plot: N = 1000 Simulations for Varied 
Diffusion Rates 
After iterative analysis, initially running the simulation in increments of 5% 
followed by increments of 1% and 0.1%, we find 4.9% to be the most acceptable diffusion 
rate modeled by the natural logarithmic function for the algorithm, as seen in Figure 24 
showing the MAV network plot with no disruption, overlaid with the AQ network 
cumulative plot’s natural logarithmic trendline. For each series of sociograms in this 
section, the left image displays the network at year 3, the middle at year 6, and the right at 
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year 10, where red nodes are CW-capable VNSA and blue nodes are not CW-capable. For 
cumulative plots, the thick, black lines indicate the mean values of CW-capable VNSA for 
each year labeled with the 3, 6, and 10-year values rounded to the nearest tenth. 
 
Figure 24. MAV Sociograms at Time = 3, 6, 10 (top), AQ Network Trendline vs. MAV 
Network CW TTP Migration (bottom) 
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D. COERCIVE DISRUPTION OF MAV NETWORK 
For coercive disruption, we target the most central organizations’ ability to continue 
their CW programs (i.e., node with highest degree centrality score). Therefore, in the 
coercive disruption model we remove AQ’s CW attribute and ensure that throughout the 
simulation, ULFA does not adopt CW. For AQ, coercive disruption implies a 
comprehensive strategy applying pressure closer to their primary operating areas in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, leaving them risk adverse from spreading CW TTP. For ULFA, coercive 
CP involves intelligence collection on critical facilities and personnel and executing the 
targeting cycle on suspected CW development processes, scientists, and logistics using 
conventional and SOF assets. Figure 25 shows the cumulative plot and sociograms for this 
disruption simulation. 
 
Figure 25. Coercion-Disruption CW Attribute at Time = 3, 6, 10 (top), CW Migration 
with Coercive Disruption, 4.9% Diffusion Rate (bottom) 
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E. IO DISRUPTION OF MAV NETWORK 
In leveraging IO options to disrupt the MAV network, the alliances, or ties, are 
targeted rather than the organizations. Those ties could include trust and influence, direct 
communications, and logistics routes. Therefore, instead of targeting a central node, IO 
techniques target the ties emanating from the nodes with the highest brokerage (low Burt 
constraint) score. It just so happens that in the MAV network, the two nodes with highest 
degree centrality (AQ and ULFA) also have the highest brokerage scores, which further 
enables our coercion/IO comparative analysis by controlling for the topological measures 
and focusing on which disruption strategy is optimal.  
To “conduct IO” against ties coming from AQ and ULFA, we sever one-third of 
their ties, consistent with the ABM from Chapter IV. These two IO actions could consist 
of a combination of cyber operation, psychological warfare technique, disinformation 
campaign, intelligence collection, and/or HUMINT source operation. The SOJ2/3 cell must 
work with kinetic and non-kinetic targeters to decide specific tactic within each category 
(coercive/IO) has the highest chance of success with greatest efficacy, which is usually 
largely driven by the timeline, target, and unit capabilities. Given these factors, we must 
also consider how the JSOTF-M monitors disruption effects. For example, in the case of 
ULFA which has a high brokerage score, it only has about a dozen ties initially, while AQ 
has over twice that amount. Admittedly, it could become difficult to know while 
conducting IO that one-third of AQ’s ties remain disrupted. Nevertheless, for purposes of 
comparison against coercion operations, this method of analysis suffices because it would 
also be difficult to know with absolute certainty that AQ is no longer CW-capable after 
conventional or SOF operations remove the CW attribute. Figure 26 shows the cumulative 
plot and sociograms for this disruption simulation. 
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Figure 26. Top: IO-Disruption CW Migration (time = 3, 6, 10); Bottom: CW Migration 
with IO Disruption, 4.9% Diffusion Rate 
From here, we see that on average, given the specified diffusion rate and defined 
coercion/IO actions, IO reduces the number of CW-capable nodes by approximately one 
more node in comparison to each corresponding time step from the coercion simulation. 
Interestingly, IO disruption yields a linear trend in year-over-year increase of CW nodes, 
while coercion retains the logarithmic trendline from the original diffusion plot without 
disruption. It is critical to note, however, that these simulations only present a framework 
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for a notional, realistic case study to evaluate potential disruption strategies. With even a 
slightly different network or different environmental factors (and therefore different 
diffusion rates), the preferred disruption method could change for each scenario. 
To evaluate robustness of this model and determine how important the 
environmental factors are, we rerun the simulation in Figure 27 with different diffusion 
rates representing more extreme (positive and negative) conditions. First, when assessing 
CW TTP migration with a diffusion rate less than approximately 4.4%, no migration 
occurs; instead, the initial number of CW nodes (13) persists for the full duration. On the 
other end of the spectrum, we present simulation results using a diffusion rate of 50% and 
see that the number of CW-capable nodes approaches 40 nodes by step 6. In comparing 
coercive and IO disruption at 50% diffusion, we see similar steady-state (final) values, 
although the maximum value (23 nodes) is reached by step 3 in coercive disruption and by 
step 6 in IO disruption. 
We therefore conclude that in general, IO has the potential of mitigating CW TTP 
migration somewhat more effectively than coercive (kinetic/non-kinetic, using 
SOF/conventional) disruption, with the understanding that each tactic may perform 
differently with different network topologies. Nevertheless, these results show that varying 
degrees of diffusion (from different external, environmental, and strategic factors acting 
on the network) will not significantly change which disruption method performs better. 
Instead, the network topology likely plays a larger role (along with the specific objective 
as defined by the Commander’s Intent, as shown in Chapter IV) in determining which 




Figure 27. 4.4% Diffusion with Coercive & IO Disruption (top left), 50% Diffusion 
without Disruption (top right), 50% Diffusion with Coercive Disruption (bottom 
left), 50% Diffusion with IO Disruption (bottom right) 
F. DISRUPTION MODEL RESULTS 
In this case study, we see a modest advantage to using IO disruption over coercive 
disruption in preventing further CW TTP migration throughout the MAV alliance network. 
The point in time at which that choice becomes beneficial changes based on the CW TTP 
diffusion rates (which is dependent on the environmental, strategic factors acting on the 
network). However, this is specific to this situation, and even slightly different parameters 
could yield a completely different result. Therefore, it is critical to carefully consider the 
network’s characteristics, timescales, unit of analysis, implementation of disruption 
methods, diffusion rates used, and what assumptions the user makes.  
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In a series of simulations using no disruption as the baseline, with a CW TTP 
diffusion rate of 4.9%, the model shows IO disruption reduces CW TTP migration by 
8.91%, 16.79%, and 23.93% at years 3, 6, and 10, respectively. Coercive disruption reduces 
CW TTP migration by 14.36%, 12.60%, and 9.5% at years 3, 6, and 10, respectively. It is 
interesting that at this lower diffusion rate, coercive disruption is almost twice as effective 
as IO in the short term with lower diffusion rates, but less than half as effective in the long 
term. This is likely because less nodes gain the attribute initially when a highly central 
VNSA lost its CW capability during coercive disruption. On the other hand, IO disruption 
allowed the central node (AQ) to retain the attribute, but it was not able to spread the 
knowledge or material effectively due to the severed ties. Contrarily, in scenarios with a 
diffusion rate as high as 50%, IO is only slightly more effective in the short term than 
coercion, but each method has similar outcomes past year 6. This disparity is likely due to 
the fact that with higher TTP diffusion rates within an environment, communication 
becomes more important than the attribute itself, and so kinetic or non-kinetic coercion has 
a relatively limited effect in the near term compared to IO until a “critical mass” of CW-






VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analytic approaches conducted in this research, we obtain several 
policy recommendations for counter-proliferation (CP) forces in opposing VNSA seeking 
chemical weapons (CW). 
• Strategic intelligence of countries and regions in crisis, or developing crisis, is 
essential to anticipating CW proliferation among VNSA networks. To that end, 
HUMINT operations must be incorporated early on to provide plans and 
intentions needed within an organization to understand the leadership’s 
psychological factors with respect to CW adoption decisions. 
• Operational intelligence of VNSA assists in later phases of the technology 
adoption model, in which the organization’s leadership has decided to acquire 
CW materials and begin mobilization of assets for staging potential attacks. This 
demands intelligence collection and all-source analysts leverage dual use and 
logistics networks of relevant materials, with an emphasis on the demand side of 
transactions. Furthermore, the HUMINT-derived strategic intelligence must 
enable tipping/cueing of SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT capabilities to monitor, 
and ultimately anticipate, the VNSA’s tactical actions. 
• Cyber operations must be integrated early on in crisis development to facilitate 
intelligence collection, information operations, and coercion operations 
throughout the CP campaign, particularly with decentralized VNSA alliance 
networks. 
• The Commander must consider both Information Operations (IO) and coercive 
disruption techniques based on the characteristics of both the interorganizational 
network and the VNSA of interest. When a central VNSA adopts CW, short-term 
objectives support coercion operations but long-term (typically longer than 2–3 
years) CP efforts demand IO methods to contain TTP migration. A two-pronged 
effort combining IO and coercive CP would likely provide enhanced results on a 
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larger array of network topologies and diffusion rates, although further analysis is 
needed to confirm this strategy. 
• Other Units of Action within DoD and Interagency organizations could readily 
contribute to CP efforts. Expeditionary units that contribute significant 
capabilities (CP, EOD, expeditionary intelligence, expeditionary exploitation, 
etc.) would greatly benefit from more extensive integration in non-kinetic 
coercion and other IO functions. While these assets are often already involved in 
kinetic coercive disruption via direct support or TACON within a task force or 
other organizational structure, leveraging these expeditionary assets (although 
non-SOF) can serve as force multipliers due to their unique access, expertise, and 
perspectives. 
• It would benefit relevant operations/intelligence fusion centers combatting CW 
(or WMD in general) proliferation to use concepts and recommendations 
presented herein with a feedback loop approach (see below). 
In the feedback system model, developed in MATLAB’s Simulink software, Figure 
28 shows inputs (predetermined elements by the Fusion Cell conducting the analysis and 
CONOP development) and outputs (results of the model that can be used to measure 
performance and effectiveness). The inputs are Independent Variable (IV) 1–4 on the left-
hand side, and they correlate to environmental factors to consider as used in Chapter III 
such as GDP, population, or conflict levels.  
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Figure 28. Ops/Intel Counterproliferation Feedback System 
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The more IVs used, the more accurate the model, but it may be challenging to 
isolate the effects of a particular IV. We use the IV selector to choose which environmental 
factors to consider in the model. The environmental factors system represents the model 
built from regression analysis, and the interorganizational network (before CW TTP 
migration) represents the initial condition of the alliance network and requires SNA for 
model development. The CW TTP diffusion rate (or rates if using a more robust model 
with variable rates based on the network or environmental factors) considers the network 
characteristics, environmental factors, and intervention methods. Intervention methods, as 
shown by the blue inputs, represent coercive CP operations (which directly affects a node 
within the network) or IO-centric CP (which directly affects the network structure by 
altering internodal ties). After CW TTP migration, and the predetermined number of time-
steps desired for modeling, the organizational threat factors is represented by the respective 
system block on the right-hand side. This threat, which is ultimately affected by the 
organization’s perceived risks and benefits to adopting CW TTP based on psychological, 
strategic, operational, and tactical factors already discussed. Finally, the observed strategic 
and operational/tactical threat levels of a region or operational area are measured through 
all-source intelligence collection and analysis on red forces, each with their own weighted 
values of effectiveness based on the situation. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
To improve the regression model’s accuracy in predicting whether CW events will 
occur, additional independent variables are necessary. When possible, independent 
variables should be quantitative to reduce bias inherent with qualitative, categorical data. 
Future work must also confine datasets to specific strategic environments in terms of 
conflict level, region, types of actors on all sides of the conflict, demographics, recent 
events involving CW and the public reaction, and other factors that could promote or 
prevent CW use. Conducting regressions in certain parts of CENTCOM will look different 
than in other parts, and even more so in the vast, heterogeneous INDOPACOM region. 
Other factors to consider for independent variables include: 
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• State sponsorship of the VNSA, and the sponsor’s characteristics such as 
stockpile data, historical CW use, and conflict levels within the nation 
state. 
• Leadership of the VNSA, and the associated psychological factors as 
documented by UMD’s START research and others. 
• Whether or not recent events included CW incidents, whether the region 
of interest was aware of such incidents, and what the local and global 
reactions were in the media and public over such incidents. 
• Success rate of other forms of terrorist attacks such as IEDs, firearms, and 
vehicles. 
• Availability of CW precursors and dual use materials. 
• Availability of expertise, either through industry, academia, military, or 
other means. 
The actor-based model could also use several improvements to better predict how 
CW TTP migrate throughout the alliance network from a given CW-capable VNSA with 
high centrality scores. First, TTP migration has been shown to occur downstream beyond 
the initial transfer of a technology. Therefore, the ABM could be improved by determining 
what the diffusion rate is for second and third order transfers of the technology. Does a 
low-level member of a VNSA collaborate with a friend in another VNSA to provide CW 
technologies or materiel? Does a large VNSA that received CW from a state sponsor then 
quickly transfer that to some of its smaller proxy VNSA allies? Filling these gaps can better 
inform the ABM in providing variable diffusion rates throughout a network. 
The ABM could also consider the strategic and operational environmental factors, 
as done in Chapter III with multiple regressions, for each organization and the country or 
region in which it operates. The ABM used in Chapters IV and V assumed constant 
environmental factors, and thus a constant diffusion rate. However, with the MAV 
network, organizations operating in India would likely have a different diffusion rate 
(either in exporting or importing CW TTP) than organizations operating in the Philippines 
due to a myriad of factors. Having diffusion rates associated to each node would create a 
much more robust ABM. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
While some policymakers and academics are still attempting to identify what a 
weapon of mass destruction is and is not, SOCOM CP practitioners and operators are 
struggling to balance great power competition with the continuing Global War on Terror 
and a rise in VNSA pursuit of chemical weapons. Therefore, the CP community must 
prioritize its efforts to optimize results given the dynamic nature of the problem set. When 
faced with Priority Intelligence Requirements involving whether a VNSA will pursue CW, 
this study reveals that increased conflict levels usually lead to an increased probability of 
CW adoption. There are nuanced factors, such as the symmetry, duration, and nature of the 
conflicts, but in general the non-permissive environment increases a VNSA’s demand to 
adopt CW. Therefore, when a region begins to show signs of increased violence and unrest, 
intelligence efforts should initiate a process to develop a HUMINT collection network and 
potentially begin allocating technical means of collection, to include a prominence on the 
demand side of dual use logistics networks. 
Along with understanding a VNSA of interest that may pursue CW, intelligence 
efforts should also emphasize the inter-organizational networks in the physical and cyber 
domains. The methods and extent to which multiple VNSA interact have been shown to 
have a direct effect on whether CW TTP migrate across organizations and regions. 
Therefore, HUMINT, SIGINT, and other cyber/IO efforts should focus not only on a target 
organization but each of its closest allies. Using these collection methods, the Commander 
tasked with CP lines of effort will have more tools at their disposal to attempt disruption 
of the network, such as cutting ties via IO and eliminating or severely degrading CW 
capability from each node. Furthermore, extensive social network analysis (facilitated by 
all-source analysis that yields an adequately comprehensive view of the interorganizational 
network) enables the identification of optimal targets for CP and intelligence operations; 
the most central nodes should be the focus, and while we used degree centrality here for its 
straightforward calculation, alternative centrality measures could offer improved results if 
the network’s topology warrants it. For example, some networks may be disrupted easier 
if CP assets coercively targeted nodes with high eigenvector centrality. Further analysis 
comparing different centrality measures and their corresponding disruption results could 
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offer better insight into when an analyst should choose each centrality measure. Thus, a 
comprehensive actor-based model can run simulations using strategic and operational 
intelligence, in conjunction with operational and tactical disruption options, to identify the 
preferred course of action for counterproliferation campaigns.  
Moving forward, this framework shows how regression analysis to create 
environmental factor models, social network analysis to map interorganizational networks, 
and a robust actor-based model via Monte Carlo simulations, can be combined to inform 
the SOF Commander in developing proactive efforts to prevent CW proliferation and 
enhance security in non-permissive environments. Further efforts to develop these 
capabilities will certainly be worth the resources expended when lives are saved through 
improved analysis of the complex dynamics of technology proliferation between violent 
non-state actors. With the models methods shown in this report, CWMD Task Forces can 
inject real-world data on environmental factors to inform predictive intelligence on the 
probability of CW adoption among non-state actors. Furthermore, if intelligence on 
alliances between organizations are available, analysts and operators can now simulate CP 
strategies and decide to what extent should kinetic/non-kinetic coercive actions and IO 
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APPENDIX A.  R CODE 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Aaron Green & Chris Price: R Script for Chapter III                     % 
%                                                                         % 
%                                                                         % 















#input the GTD and POICN dataset (combined) 
gtd <- read_csv(‘GTD_With POICN Chem Added.csv’) 
###############################################################################
###### 
#filtering out the gtd for the particular years and needed columns 
fgtd <- gtd %>% 
 select(`iyear`, `country_txt`,`weaptype1_txt`) %>% 
 filter(`iyear` >=1995) %>% 
 filter(`iyear` <=2017)  
 
#renaming the columns - probably unnecessary 
fgtd <- rename(fgtd, `year` = `iyear`) 
fgtd <- rename(fgtd, country = country_txt) 
 
#adding a new column to count events using chemicals and assigning a 1 and 0 to 
say whether there was a chem event or not. 
fgtd$chemical <- NA 
fgtd$chemical [fgtd$weaptype1_txt == ‘Chemical’] <- 1 
fgtd$chemical [fgtd$weaptype1_txt != ‘Chemical’] <- 0 
 
#same for explosives 
fgtd$explosive <- NA 
fgtd$explosive [fgtd$weaptype1_txt == ‘Explosives’] <- 1 
fgtd$explosive [fgtd$weaptype1_txt != ‘Explosives’] <- 0 
 
#same for incendiary 
fgtd$incendiary <- NA 
fgtd$incendiary [fgtd$weaptype1_txt == ‘Incendiary’] <- 1 
fgtd$incendiary [fgtd$weaptype1_txt != ‘Incendiary’] <- 0 
 
#removing column to remove unwanted duplicates 
fgtd$weaptype1_txt = NULL 
 
 
#set up df for country / year 
df <- d_mutate(fgtd,  
              cnt_chem = sum(chemical), 
              cnt_inc = sum(incendiary), 
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              cnt_exp = sum(explosive), 
              .by=c(country, year), 
              .cross=TRUE, 
              .reduce=TRUE) 
 
#selecting the wanted columns 
df <- select(df, year, country, cnt_chem, cnt_inc, cnt_exp) 
 
#removing duplicates 
df <-distinct(df, .keep_all = FALSE) 
 
#adding column for binomial regression 
df$chemical <- 0 
df$chemical [df$cnt_chem >0] <- 1 
 
#changing NAs to 0 
df [is.na(df)] <- 0 
 






#loading UCDP dataset 
ucdp <- read_xlsx(‘UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.xlsx’) 
 
#filtering ucdp for year, type of violence, country, and best estimate of 
resulting deaths 
dp <- ucdp %>% 
 select(year, type_of_violence, country, best) %>% 
 filter(year >=1995) %>% 
 filter(year <=2017) 
 
#type of violence is 1 - state based; 2 - non-state; 3 - one-sided violence 
###################################################################### 
#adding columns to tally the amount and type of violent events 
dp$state <- 0 
dp$state [dp$type_of_violence == 1] <- 1 
dp$non_state <- 0 
dp$non_state [dp$type_of_violence == 2] <- 1 
dp$oneside <- 0 
dp$oneside [dp$type_of_violence == 3] <- 1 
dp$totalconflict <- 0 
dp$totalconflict [dp$type_of_violence %in% c(1,2,3)] <- 1 
 
#tallying the deaths so when one type of conflict = 1, it takes the number of 
deaths (1 x # of deaths = # of deaths) 
dp$state_deaths <- dp$state * dp$best 
dp$non_state_deaths <- dp$non_state * dp$best 
dp$oneside_deaths <- dp$oneside * dp$best 
 
#creating country,year 
dp_cy <- d_mutate(dp,  
                 non_state_deaths = sum(non_state_deaths), 
                 state_deaths = sum(state_deaths), 
                 oneside_deaths = sum(oneside_deaths), 
                 cnt_statebased = sum(state), 
                 cnt_non_state_based = sum(non_state), 
                 cnt_onesidebased = sum(oneside), 
                 cnt_totalconflict = sum(totalconflict), 
                 cnt_death = sum(best), 
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                 .by=c(country, year), 
                 .cross=TRUE, 
                 .reduce=TRUE) 
 







dp_cy <-distinct(dp_cy, .keep_all = FALSE) 
 
#changing NA to 0 
dp_cy [is.na(dp_cy)] <- 0 
 
#merging with df 
df1 <- magic_merge(dp_cy, df) 
 
df1 <- select(df1, gw_year, gw_name, cnt_death, cnt_statebased, 
cnt_non_state_based, cnt_onesidebased, cnt_totalconflict, non_state_deaths, 
             state_deaths, oneside_deaths,cnt_chem, cnt_inc, cnt_exp, chemical) 
 
#changing NA to 0 










pol <- pol %>% 
 select(`country`, `year`, `polity2`) %>% 
 filter(`year` >=1995) %>% 
 filter(`year` <=2017) 
 
#merging pol with df 






#reading in pop / gdppc  
dev <-read_csv(‘WDIData.csv’) 
 
#creating vector for desired indicators 
tgt_indicators <- c(‘GDP per capita (current US$)’, 
                   ‘Population, total’, 
                   ‘Population density (people per sq. km of land area)’) 
 
#adding a prefix to year so the years can be modified for long data vs wide 
data 
dev <- dev %>%  
 rename_if(is.double, ~ paste0(“year_,” .)) %>%  
 gather(year, indicatorvalue, starts_with(“year_”)) %>%  
 mutate(year = str_remove(year, ‘year_’)) %>%  
 mutate(year = as.integer(year)) 
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#selecting the useful columns and filtering the required years and countries 
dev1 <- dev %>% 
 select(year, `Country Name`, `Indicator Name`, indicatorvalue) %>% 
 filter(`year` >=1995) %>% 
 filter(`year` <=2017) %>%  
 filter(`Indicator Name` %in% tgt_indicators) 
 
#adjusting the column names 
dev1 <- rename(dev1, indicator = `Indicator Name`) 
dev1 <- rename(dev1, `gw_name` = `Country Name`) 
 
#spreading indicators 
dev1 <- spread(dev1, indicator, indicatorvalue)  
 
# Fix column names 
names(dev1) <- fix_names(names(dev1)) 
 
#logging numbers to mitigate outliers 
dev1$poplog <- log(dev1$population__total +1) 
dev1$popdenlog <- log(dev1$population_density__people_per_sq__km_of_land_area_ 
+1) 
dev1$gdppclog <- log(dev1$gdp_per_capita__current_us__ +1) 
 
 
dev1_cy <- d_mutate(dev1,  
                 popdenlog = sum(popdenlog), 
                 poplog = sum(poplog), 
                 gdppclog = sum(gdppclog), 
                 .by=c(gw_name, year), 
                 .cross=TRUE, 
                 .reduce=TRUE) 
 




#setting log for counts of conflict to mitigate outliers 
df3$cnt_statebasedlog <- log(df3$cnt_statebased+1) 
df3$cnt_non_state_basedlog <- log(df3$cnt_non_state_based+1) 
df3$cnt_onesidebasedlog <- log(df3$cnt_onesidebased+1) 
df3$cnt_totalconflictlog <- log(df3$cnt_totalconflict+1) 
df3$cnt_deathlog <- log(df3$cnt_death+1) 
df3$cnt_non_state_deathslog <- log(df3$non_state_deaths + 1) 
df3$cnt_state_deathslog <- log(df3$state_deaths + 1) 
df3$cnt_oneside_deathslog <- log(df3$oneside_deaths + 1) 
 
## Lagging the dataset by 1 year, except for the chemical weapon events to show 
whether a chemical weapon was a result of previous experiences 
df3 <- d_mutate(df3,  
               totalconflictlag  = lag(cnt_totalconflict, n=1), 
               statebasedlag = lag(cnt_statebased, n=1), 
               nonstatebasedlag = lag(cnt_non_state_based, n=1), 
               onesidebasedlag = lag(cnt_onesidebased, n=1), 
               totalconflictlaglog = lag(cnt_totalconflictlog, n=1), 
               statebasedlaglog = lag(cnt_statebasedlog, n=1), 
               nonstatebasedlaglog = lag(cnt_non_state_basedlog, n=1), 
               onesidebasedlaglog = lag(cnt_onesidebasedlog, n=1), 
               deathlaglog = lag(cnt_deathlog, n=1), 
               nonstatedeathlaglog = lag(cnt_non_state_deathslog, n=1), 
               statedeathlaglog = lag(cnt_state_deathslog, n=1), 
               onesidedeathlaglog = lag(cnt_oneside_deathslog, n=1), 
               state_deathslag = lag(state_deaths, n=1), 
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               peace_years   = spell(cnt_totalconflict, 0), 
               .by = gw_name) 
 
#selecting the columns of interest - just making it a little more streamlined 
df3 <- select(df3, gw_name, gw_year, poplog, popdenlog, gdppclog, polity2, 
chemical, nonstatebasedlaglog, statebasedlaglog, onesidebasedlaglog, 
             deathlaglog, nonstatedeathlaglog, statedeathlaglog, 
state_deathslag, onesidedeathlaglog, peace_years) 
 
#getting rid of NAs that added up during the previous tidy 
df3$chemical [is.na(df3$chemical)] <- 0 
df3$nonstatebasedlaglog [is.na(df3$nonstatebasedlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$statebasedlaglog [is.na(df3$statebasedlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$onesidebasedlaglog [is.na(df3$onesidebasedlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$deathlaglog [is.na(df3$deathlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$nonstatedeathlaglog [is.na(df3$nonstatedeathlaglog)] <- 0  
df3$statedeathlaglog [is.na(df3$statedeathlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$onesidedeathlaglog [is.na(df3$onesidedeathlaglog)] <- 0 






x <- glm(chemical ~ nonstatebasedlaglog + nonstatedeathlaglog + 
statebasedlaglog + statedeathlaglog + onesidebasedlaglog + onesidedeathlaglog + 
polity2 + I(polity2^2) + gdppclog + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) + 
I(peace_years^3), data = df3, family = binomial) 
 
a <- glm(chemical ~ nonstatebasedlaglog + statebasedlaglog + onesidebasedlaglog 
+ gdppclog + polity2 + I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) + 
I(peace_years^3), data = df3, family = binomial) 
 
b <- glm(chemical ~ nonstatedeathlaglog + statedeathlaglog + onesidedeathlaglog 
+ gdppclog + polity2 + I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) + 
I(peace_years^3), data = df3, family = binomial) 
 
c <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + onesidedeathlaglog + gdppclog + polity2 
+ I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) + I(peace_years^3), 
data = df3, family = binomial) 
 
d <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + 
onesidedeathlaglog + I(onesidedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + polity2 + 
I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) + I(peace_years^3), data 
= df3, family = binomial) 
 
e <- glm(chemical ~ statebasedlaglog + I(statebasedlaglog^2) + 
onesidebasedlaglog + I(onesidebasedlaglog^2) + gdppclog + polity2 + 
I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) + I(peace_years^3), data 
= df3, family = binomial) 
 
#printing out model stats and organizing the variables appropriately 
stargazer(x, a, b, c, d, e,  type=‘text’,  
         order = c(15,16,17,11,12,3,5,4,7,6,10,8,9,1,2,13,14), 
         out=‘modelregression.html’) 
 









#coefficient plot for the models. First plot are the control variables. 
Choosing the model with 
#all of the variables and the best model 
p <- magic_plot(d, plot.type=‘coef’,  
               colors=‘dark green’, 
               coef.offset = 0.1, 
               line.lwd = 30, 
               yaxis.size = 6, 
               xlim = c(-1, 1), 
               xvar=c(‘peace_years’, 
                      ‘I(peace_years^2)’, 
                      ‘I(peace_years^3)’, 
                      ‘polity2’,  
                      ‘I(polity2^2)’, 
                      ‘poplog’,  
                      ‘gdppclog’), 
               yaxis.labels=c(‘Peace Years’, 
                              ‘Peace Years (squared)’, 
                              ‘Peace Years (cubed)’, 
                              ‘Democracy’,  
                              ‘Democracy (squared)’, 
                              ‘Population’, 
                              ‘GDP per capita’), 
               ylab.space = .05, 
               legend=c(‘Model 5**’, ‘Model 1’), 
               legend.loc = (‘bottomleft’), 
               legend.col=c(‘dark green’, ‘red’), 
               background = ‘white’, 
               finish=FALSE) 
magic_plot(x, coef.offset=-0.1, colors=‘red’, args=p, finish=TRUE) 
 
#this plot is for the test variables 
p2 <- magic_plot(d, plot.type=‘coef’,  
               colors=‘dark green’, 
               coef.offset = 0.1, 
               line.lwd = 30, 
               yaxis.size = 6, 
               xlim = c(-1, 1), 
               xvar=c(‘statebasedlaglog’, 
                      ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
                      ‘I(statedeathlaglog^2)’, 
                      ‘onesidebasedlaglog’, 
                      ‘onesidedeathlaglog’, 
                      ‘I(onesidedeathlaglog^2)’), 
               yaxis.labels=c(‘State-Based Conflict’, 
                              ‘State-Based Deaths’, 
                              ‘State-Based Deaths \n(squared)’, 
                              ‘One-Side Violence’, 
                              ‘One-Side Deaths’, 
                              ‘One-Side Deaths \n(squared)’), 
               legend=c(‘Model 5**’, ‘Model 1’), 
               legend.col=c(‘dark green’, ‘red’), 
               legend.loc = (‘bottomleft’), 
               background = ‘white’, 
               finish=FALSE) 
magic_plot(x, coef.offset=-0.03, colors=‘red’, args=p2, finish=TRUE) 
 
#plotting the graph for state death 
g <- magic_plot(d, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
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               ylab = ‘Probability of CW Use’,  
               xlab=‘Deaths from State-Based Conflict’, 
               alpha = 0.05, 
               colors = c(‘dark green’), 
               background = ‘white’, 
               foreground = ‘black’, 
               margin = c(60,60,35,15), 
               title.space = c(5),  
               ylim=c(0, 1),  
               xlim = c(0,11), 
               xlab.space = 45, 
               ylab.space = 35, 





#using zvar population 
g1 <- magic_plot(d, 
                xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
                zvar = “poplog”, 
                ylab = ‘Probability of CW Use’,  
                xlab=‘Deaths from State-Based Conflict’, 
                zlab = “Population”, 
                alpha = 0.05, 
                colors = c(‘Spectral’), 
                background = ‘white’, 
                foreground = ‘black’, 
                margin = c(60,60,35,15), 
                title.space = c(5),  
                ylim=c(0, 1),  
                xlim = c(0,11), 
                xlab.space = 45, 
                ylab.space = 35, 
                finish = TRUE) 
 
#using zvar for gdp 
g2 <- magic_plot(d, 
                xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
                zvar = “gdppclog”, 
                ylab = ‘Probability of CW Use’,  
                xlab=‘Deaths from State-Based Conflict’, 
                zlab = “GDP per Capita”, 
                alpha = 0.05, 
                colors = c(‘Spectral’), 
                background = ‘white’, 
                foreground = ‘black’, 
                margin = c(60,60,35,15), 
                title.space = c(5),  
                ylim=c(0, 1),  
                xlim = c(0,11), 
                xlab.space = 45, 
                ylab.space = 35, 




#using zvar for democracy 
g3 <- magic_plot(d, 
                xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
                zvar = “polity2”, 
                ylab = ‘Probability of CW Use’,  
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                xlab=‘Deaths from State-Based Conflict’, 
                zlab = “Democracy”, 
                alpha = 0.05, 
                colors = c(‘Spectral’), 
                background = ‘white’, 
                foreground = ‘black’, 
                margin = c(60,60,35,15), 
                title.space = c(5),  
                ylim=c(0, 1),  
                xlim = c(0,11), 
                xlab.space = 45, 
                ylab.space = 35, 



















#input the GTD and POICN dataset (combined) 
gtd <- read_csv(‘GTD_With POICN Chem Added.csv’) 
###############################################################################
###### 
#filtering out the gtd for the particular years and needed columns 
fgtd <- gtd %>% 
 select(`iyear`, `country_txt`,`weaptype1_txt`) %>% 
 filter(`iyear` >=1995) %>% 
 filter(`iyear` <=2017)  
 
#renaming the columns - probably unnecessary 
fgtd <- rename(fgtd, `year` = `iyear`) 
fgtd <- rename(fgtd, country = country_txt) 
 
#adding a new column to count events using chemicals and assigning a 1 and 0 to 
say whether there was a chem event or not. 
fgtd$chemical <- NA 
fgtd$chemical [fgtd$weaptype1_txt == ‘Chemical’] <- 1 
fgtd$chemical [fgtd$weaptype1_txt != ‘Chemical’] <- 0 
 
#same for explosives 
fgtd$explosive <- NA 
fgtd$explosive [fgtd$weaptype1_txt == ‘Explosives’] <- 1 
fgtd$explosive [fgtd$weaptype1_txt != ‘Explosives’] <- 0 
 
#same for incendiary 
fgtd$incendiary <- NA 
fgtd$incendiary [fgtd$weaptype1_txt == ‘Incendiary’] <- 1 
fgtd$incendiary [fgtd$weaptype1_txt != ‘Incendiary’] <- 0 
 
#removing column to remove unwanted duplicates 
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fgtd$weaptype1_txt = NULL 
 
 
#set up df for country / year 
df <- d_mutate(fgtd,  
              cnt_chem = sum(chemical), 
              cnt_inc = sum(incendiary), 
              cnt_exp = sum(explosive), 
              .by=c(country, year), 
              .cross=TRUE, 
              .reduce=TRUE) 
 
#selecting the wanted columns 
df <- select(df, year, country, cnt_chem, cnt_inc, cnt_exp) 
 
#removing duplicates 
df <-distinct(df, .keep_all = FALSE) 
 
#adding column for binomial regression 
df$chemical <- 0 
df$chemical [df$cnt_chem >0] <- 1 
 
#changing NAs to 0 
df [is.na(df)] <- 0 
 






#loading UCDP dataset 
ucdp <- read_xlsx(‘UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.xlsx’) 
 
#filtering ucdp for year, type of violence, country, and best estimate of 
resulting deaths 
dp <- ucdp %>% 
 select(year, type_of_violence, country, best) %>% 
 filter(year >=1995) %>% 
 filter(year <=2017) 
 
#type of violence is 1 - state based; 2 - non-state; 3 - one-sided violence 
###################################################################### 
#adding columns to tally the amount and type of violent events 
dp$state <- 0 
dp$state [dp$type_of_violence == 1] <- 1 
dp$non_state <- 0 
dp$non_state [dp$type_of_violence == 2] <- 1 
dp$oneside <- 0 
dp$oneside [dp$type_of_violence == 3] <- 1 
dp$totalconflict <- 0 
dp$totalconflict [dp$type_of_violence %in% c(1,2,3)] <- 1 
 
#tallying the deaths so when one type of conflict = 1, it takes the number of 
deaths (1 x # of deaths = # of deaths) 
dp$state_deaths <- dp$state * dp$best 
dp$non_state_deaths <- dp$non_state * dp$best 
dp$oneside_deaths <- dp$oneside * dp$best 
 
#creating country,year 
dp_cy <- d_mutate(dp,  
                 non_state_deaths = sum(non_state_deaths), 
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                 state_deaths = sum(state_deaths), 
                 oneside_deaths = sum(oneside_deaths), 
                 cnt_statebased = sum(state), 
                 cnt_non_state_based = sum(non_state), 
                 cnt_onesidebased = sum(oneside), 
                 cnt_totalconflict = sum(totalconflict), 
                 cnt_death = sum(best), 
                 .by=c(country, year), 
                 .cross=TRUE, 
                 .reduce=TRUE) 
 







dp_cy <-distinct(dp_cy, .keep_all = FALSE) 
 
#changing NA to 0 
dp_cy [is.na(dp_cy)] <- 0 
 
#merging with df 
df1 <- magic_merge(dp_cy, df) 
 
df1 <- select(df1, gw_year, gw_name, cnt_death, cnt_statebased, 
cnt_non_state_based, cnt_onesidebased, cnt_totalconflict, non_state_deaths, 
             state_deaths, oneside_deaths,cnt_chem, cnt_inc, cnt_exp, chemical) 
 
#changing NA to 0 










pol <- pol %>% 
 select(`country`, `year`, `polity2`) %>% 
 filter(`year` >=1995) %>% 
 filter(`year` <=2017) 
 
#merging pol with df 






#reading in pop / gdppc  
dev <-read_csv(‘WDIData.csv’) 
 
#creating vector for desired indicators 
tgt_indicators <- c(‘GDP per capita (current US$)’, 
                   ‘Population, total’, 
                   ‘Population density (people per sq. km of land area)’) 
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#adding a prefix to year so the years can be modified for long data vs wide 
data 
dev <- dev %>%  
 rename_if(is.double, ~ paste0(“year_,” .)) %>%  
 gather(year, indicatorvalue, starts_with(“year_”)) %>%  
 mutate(year = str_remove(year, ‘year_’)) %>%  
 mutate(year = as.integer(year)) 
 
#selecting the useful columns and filtering the required years and countries 
dev1 <- dev %>% 
 select(year, `Country Name`, `Indicator Name`, indicatorvalue) %>% 
 filter(`year` >=1995) %>% 
 filter(`year` <=2017) %>%  
 filter(`Indicator Name` %in% tgt_indicators) 
 
#adjusting the column names 
dev1 <- rename(dev1, indicator = `Indicator Name`) 
dev1 <- rename(dev1, `gw_name` = `Country Name`) 
 
#spreading indicators 
dev1 <- spread(dev1, indicator, indicatorvalue)  
 
# Fix column names 
names(dev1) <- fix_names(names(dev1)) 
 
#logging numbers to mitigate outliers 
dev1$poplog <- log(dev1$population__total +1) 
dev1$popdenlog <- log(dev1$population_density__people_per_sq__km_of_land_area_ 
+1) 
dev1$gdppclog <- log(dev1$gdp_per_capita__current_us__ +1) 
 
 
dev1_cy <- d_mutate(dev1,  
                   popdenlog = sum(popdenlog), 
                   poplog = sum(poplog), 
                   gdppclog = sum(gdppclog), 
                   .by=c(gw_name, year), 
                   .cross=TRUE, 
                   .reduce=TRUE) 
 




#setting log for counts of conflict to mitigate outliers 
df3$cnt_statebasedlog <- log(df3$cnt_statebased+1) 
df3$cnt_non_state_basedlog <- log(df3$cnt_non_state_based+1) 
df3$cnt_onesidebasedlog <- log(df3$cnt_onesidebased+1) 
df3$cnt_totalconflictlog <- log(df3$cnt_totalconflict+1) 
df3$cnt_deathlog <- log(df3$cnt_death+1) 
df3$cnt_non_state_deathslog <- log(df3$non_state_deaths + 1) 
df3$cnt_state_deathslog <- log(df3$state_deaths + 1) 
df3$cnt_oneside_deathslog <- log(df3$oneside_deaths + 1) 
 
## Lagging the dataset by 1 year, except for the chemical weapon events to show 
whether a chemical weapon was a result of previous experiences 
df3 <- d_mutate(df3,  
               totalconflictlag  = lag(cnt_totalconflict, n=1), 
               statebasedlag = lag(cnt_statebased, n=1), 
               nonstatebasedlag = lag(cnt_non_state_based, n=1), 
               onesidebasedlag = lag(cnt_onesidebased, n=1), 
               totalconflictlaglog = lag(cnt_totalconflictlog, n=1), 
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               statebasedlaglog = lag(cnt_statebasedlog, n=1), 
               nonstatebasedlaglog = lag(cnt_non_state_basedlog, n=1), 
               onesidebasedlaglog = lag(cnt_onesidebasedlog, n=1), 
               deathlaglog = lag(cnt_deathlog, n=1), 
               nonstatedeathlaglog = lag(cnt_non_state_deathslog, n=1), 
               statedeathlaglog = lag(cnt_state_deathslog, n=1), 
               onesidedeathlaglog = lag(cnt_oneside_deathslog, n=1), 
               state_deathslag = lag(state_deaths, n=1), 
               peace_years   = spell(cnt_totalconflict, 0), 
               .by = gw_name) 
 
#selecting the columns of interest - just making it a little more streamlined 
df3 <- df3 %>%  
 select(gw_name, gw_year, poplog, popdenlog, gdppclog, polity2, chemical, 
nonstatebasedlaglog,  
        statebasedlaglog, onesidebasedlaglog,deathlaglog, nonstatedeathlaglog,  
        statedeathlaglog, state_deathslag, onesidedeathlaglog, peace_years) 
 
#getting rid of NAs that added up during the previous tidy 
df3$chemical [is.na(df3$chemical)] <- 0 
df3$nonstatebasedlaglog [is.na(df3$nonstatebasedlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$statebasedlaglog [is.na(df3$statebasedlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$onesidebasedlaglog [is.na(df3$onesidebasedlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$deathlaglog [is.na(df3$deathlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$nonstatedeathlaglog [is.na(df3$nonstatedeathlaglog)] <- 0  
df3$statedeathlaglog [is.na(df3$statedeathlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$onesidedeathlaglog [is.na(df3$onesidedeathlaglog)] <- 0 
df3$state_deathslag [is.na(df3$state_deathslag)] <- 0 
 
#creating buckets to divide up into 4-year periods 
df3 <- df3 %>% 
 mutate(bins = case_when( 
   gw_year >= 1995 & gw_year <= 1998 ~ “1995 - 1998”, 
   gw_year >= 1999 & gw_year <= 2002 ~ “1999 - 2002”, 
   gw_year >= 2003 & gw_year <= 2006 ~ “2003 - 2006”, 
   gw_year >= 2007 & gw_year <= 2010 ~ “2007 - 2010”, 
   gw_year >= 2011 & gw_year <= 2014 ~ “2011 - 2014”, 
   gw_year >= 2015 & gw_year <= 2017 ~ “2015 - 2017” 
 )) 
 
df95 <- df3 %>%  
 filter(bins == “1995 - 1998”) 
 
df99 <- df3 %>%  
 filter(bins == “1999 - 2002”) 
 
df03 <- df3 %>%  
 filter(bins == “2003 - 2006”) 
 
df07 <- df3 %>%  
 filter(bins == “2007 - 2010”) 
 
df11 <- df3 %>%  
 filter(bins == “2011 - 2014”) 
 
df15 <- df3 %>%  
 filter(bins == “2015 - 2017”) 
 
a <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + 
polity2 + 
          I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) +  
          I(peace_years^3), data = df95, family = binomial) 
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b <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + 
polity2 + 
          I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) +  
          I(peace_years^3), data = df99, family = binomial) 
 
c <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + 
polity2 + 
          I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) +  
          I(peace_years^3), data = df03, family = binomial) 
 
d <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + 
polity2 + 
          I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) +  
          I(peace_years^3), data = df07, family = binomial) 
 
e <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + 
polity2 + 
          I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) +  
          I(peace_years^3), data = df11, family = binomial) 
 
f <- glm(chemical ~ statedeathlaglog + I(statedeathlaglog^2) + gdppclog + 
polity2 + 
          I(polity2^2) + poplog + peace_years + I(peace_years^2) +  
          I(peace_years^3), data = df15, family = binomial) 
 
stargazer(a, b, c, d, e, f, type=‘text’,  
         order = c(7, 8, 9, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 6), 
         out=‘4 year model regression stargazer.html’) 
 
#95-98   
g <- magic_plot(a, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
               title = “95-98”) 
#99-02 
g2 <- magic_plot(b, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
               title = “99-02”) 
#03-06 
g3 <- magic_plot(c, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
               title = “03-06”) 
#07-10 
g4 <- magic_plot(d, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
               title = “07-10”) 
 
#11-14 
g5 <- magic_plot(e, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 
               title = “11-14”) 
#15-17 
g6 <- magic_plot(f, 
               xvar = ‘statedeathlaglog’, 




#setting up a bar chart to show the change in probability of a CW attack over 
time based on a death rate between 
#50 - 5000 in a country-year 
form <- function(df) { 
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 df <- df$predict %>%  
   select(pred, statedeathlaglog) %>%  
   filter(statedeathlaglog >= 3.9 & statedeathlaglog <= 8.52) %>% 
   filter(pred == min(pred) | pred == max(pred)) %>%  
   mutate(differ = max(pred) - min(pred)) %>%  
   select(differ) %>%  
   distinct(.keep_all = FALSE)  
} 
 
#running form function 
g95 <- form(g) %>%  
 mutate(differ95 = differ) %>%  
 select(differ95) 
 
g99 <- form(g2) %>%  
 mutate(differ99 = differ) %>%  
 select(differ99) 
 
g03 <- form(g3) %>%  
 mutate(differ03 = differ) %>%  
 select(differ03) 
 
g07 <- form(g4) %>%  
 mutate(differ07 = differ) %>%  
 select(differ07) 
 
g11 <- form(g5) %>%  
 mutate(differ11 = differ) %>%  
 select(differ11) 
 
g15 <- form(g6) %>%  
 mutate(differ15 = differ) %>%  
 select(differ15) 
 
#combining all the g(year) into one df 
allpred <- g95 %>% 
 mutate(“95-98” = g95$differ95, 
        “99-02” = g99$differ99, 
        “03-06” = g03$differ03, 
        “07-10” = g07$differ07, 
        “11-14” = g11$differ11, 
        “15-17” = g15$differ15,) %>% 
 select(“95-98,” “99-02,” “03-06,” “07-10,” “11-14,” “15-17”) %>%  
 as_tibble() %>%  
 distinct(.keep_all = FALSE) 
 




predplot <- magic_plot(allpred, 
                      xvar =‘key’, 
                      yvar = ‘value’, 
                      plot.type = ‘bar’, 
                      ylim = c(0,1), 
                      ylab = ‘VNSA CW Attack Probability’, 
                      xlab = “Time Period”, 
                      xaxis.labels = c(“95-98,” “99-02,” “03-06,” “07-10,” “11-
14,” “15-17”), 
                      xaxis.angle = 15, 
                      colors = c(“dark green”), 
                      background = ‘white’, 
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                      foreground = ‘black’, 
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APPENDIX B.  MATLAB CODE 
clear; close all; clc; 
% A (1 x n) vector enumerating each adjacent node to AQ. 
% adjacent node (1) is directly up from AQ in ORA’s visualized network. 
for ii = 1:33 
   AQ_adj_nodes(ii) = ii; 
end 
AQ_adj_nodes = AQ_adj_nodes’;               % transpose the array 
 
%probability of CW tactics diffusing to adjacent nodes: 
pCWdif = 0.1;                               % 10 percent 
%probability of CW tactics diffusing to 2 nodes out: 
pCWdif2 = 0.05;                             % 5 percent 
N = 1000;                                   % number of monte-carlo simulations 
adj_nodes_CW = zeros(length(AQ_adj_nodes),1);   % initializes array 
 
for kk = 1:N                                % for each simulation: 
   randnum = rand(length(AQ_adj_nodes),1); % pseduorandom num generator 
   for jj = 1:length(randnum)              % threshold to pCWdif values 
       if randnum(jj) <= pCWdif            % conditional 
           adj_nodes_CW(jj) = 1;           % CW diffused successfully 
       else 
           adj_nodes_CW(jj) = 0;           % CW did not diffuse 
       end 
   end 
   numCWdiff(kk) = sum(adj_nodes_CW);      % Total CW diffusions this time 
end 
x = (1:N);                                  % variable used to plot 
figure(1) 
plot(x,numCWdiff,’.’)                       % plots as points 
figure(2)    
histogram(numCWdiff,’BinMethod’,’integers’);% histogram of CW diffusions 
xlim([-1 11]); grid on;                     % format plot 
xlabel(‘Number of Times CW Tactics Migrated’);  % horizontal axis label 
ylabel(‘Occurrences’);                      % vertical axis label 
title(‘CW Tactics Migration to AQ’’s Adjacent Nodes’); 
 
% statistical analysis: 
cint = .95;                                 % confidence interval (95%) 
z = norminv(cint+(1-cint)/2);               % z(conf int) 
ave = mean(numCWdiff)                       % mean value 
sdev = std(numCWdiff)                       % standard deviation 
int = z*sdev/sqrt(N);                       % find CI range 
 
% prints string with statistical data on plot: 
text(6,N*.8/5,sprintf(‘95%% CI  = %.4f +/- %.4f’,ave,int));%text, CI 






%% Chris Price & Aaron Green                                              % 
% This file simulates the spread of chemical weapons TTP throughout a     % 
% one-mode, inter-organizational network of Violent Non-State Actors      % 
% either operating in Myanmar or tied to a group operating in Myanmar.    % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
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clear; clc; clf;                               % clears previous variables  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
%% USER INPUTS: 
% User inputs rate of diffusion of chemical weapon TTP: 
dif = 0.049;                                % 4.9 percent 
% User inputs number of timesteps to run: 
num_steps = 10;                             % 10 years (plus starting from  
                                           % year zero) 
N = 1000;                                   % number of simulations 
MAVchemSims = zeros(N,num_steps+2);         % Initialize variable 
AveChem = zeros(1,num_steps+2);             % Initialize average num CW nodes 
vector 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                                             
% Read Data:   
   MAVtable0 = readtable(‘MAV_dichotomized.xlsx’,’TreatAsEmpty’,{‘‘});  % input 
MAV network       
   MAVtable0{:,2:end}(isnan(MAVtable0{:,2:end})) = 0;% converts NaN to zero 
   MAV0 = table2array(MAVtable0(:,2:end));          % converts table to array 
   MAVchem_table0 = readtable(‘MYR_chem.xlsx’);     % input chem attribute in 
table 
   MAVchem0 = table2array(MAVchem_table0(:,2:end)); % converts table to array 








    
% Simulation Stars... 
   % Make a 3-d matrix of MAV over time (3rd dim is time): 
   MAV = zeros(99,99,num_steps+1);         % 99 x 99 x 11 matrix 
   for m=1:num_steps+1 
       MAV(:,:,m) = MAV0;                  % initialize MAV at each timestep  
   end                                     % as MAV0 (this assumes chem 
attribute 
                                           % doesn’t go away once obtained). 
 
   % initalize matrix that indexes chem-capable VNSA at each timestep: 
   for m=1:num_steps+1 
       MAVchem(:,:,m) = MAVchem0; 
   end 
 
   %% 
   for m = 1:num_steps+1                  % for each time step... 
 
       % If a VNSA is chem-capable, then 5% of its 1st degree affiliates will 
       % become chem-capable. 
 
       ichem = find(MAVchem(:,:,m)== 1); % indexes chem-capable VNSA 
 
       if m>1 
           clear chem_add;                 % reset for each column 
           chem_add(:,1,m-1) = zeros(length(sum(MAV(:,(ichem),m))),1); 
       end 
 
       % determine how many VNSA need to become chem-capable for each 
       % timestep: 
       chem_add(:,1,m) = (round(sum(MAV(:,(ichem),m)).*dif))’; 
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       for a = 1:length(chem_add(:,1,m))       % for each VNSA that has chem... 
           if chem_add(a,1,m)>0                % if chem_add for this VNSA is 
positive... 
               b = chem_add(a,1,m);        
 
               % define the a-th column of the m-th MAV network: 
               V = MAV(:,ichem(a,1),m); 
 
               v = sum(V);             % number of VNSA #a’s ties 
               vec = find(V==1);       % row numbers of a-th column of m-th MAV 
matrix 
                                       % indicating each tie of VNSA #a 
 
               %column vector listing b random VNSA 
               r = randperm(numel(vec),b)’;        
               for k = 1:length(r)     % for the k-th element of vector r... 
                   kk = r(k);          % get the value of k-th element of r. 
                   MAVchem(kk,1,m)=1; 
               end 
           end 
       end 
      n(1,m+1) = sum(MAVchem(:,1,m)); 
      x = (0:num_steps+1); 
 
      if m<=num_steps+1 
          MAVchem(:,:,m+1)=MAVchem(:,1,m); 
      end 
 
   end 
   n(1,1) = sum(MAVchem0); 
   plot(x,n); hold on; 
    
% Put the Chemical Attribute into a matrix that captures multiple simulations: 
MAVchemSims(jj,:) = n(1,:); 
 
% Clears certain variables to re-run next simulation: 
clearvars -EXCEPT N x dif num_steps jj MAVchemSims AveChem MAV MAV0 MAVchem 
MAVchem0;    
 
end 
%% Write Excel Files to Export to SNA Software 
MAVspread = MAV(:,:,4); 
xlswrite(‘MAV3spread.xlsx’,MAVspread) 
MAVchem3spread = MAVchem(:,:,4); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem3spread.xlsx’,MAVchem3spread) 
 
MAV6spread = MAV(:,:,7); 
xlswrite(‘MAV6spread.xlsx’,MAV6spread) 
MAVchem6spread = MAVchem(:,:,7); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem6spread.xlsx’,MAVchem6spread) 
 
MAV10spread = MAV(:,:,11); 
xlswrite(‘MAV10spread.xlsx’,MAV10spread) 




%% Creates Cumulative Plots 
AveChem(1,:) = mean(MAVchemSims); 
plot(x,AveChem,’*-k’,’LineWidth’,3) 
% Format Plot: 
grid on; 
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title({‘MAV Network: CW TTP Migration, Diffusion Rate = 4.9%’;’No 
Disruption’;’Number of simulations = 1000’}) 
xlabel(‘Time (years)’); 
ylabel(‘Number of Organizations with Chemical Weapons’); 
 
% Calculate mean values at years 3, 6, and 10: 
values = round([mean(MAVchemSims(:,3)) mean(MAVchemSims(:,6)) 
mean(MAVchemSims(:,10))],1); 
 
%Print mean values on plot as string: 
txt3 = text(2.6,16,num2str(values(1)))      % Mean value at 3 years 
txt6 = text(5.6,19,num2str(values(2)))      % Mean value at 6 years 
txt10 = text(9.6,24,num2str(values(3)))     % Mean value at 10 yrs 
xlim([0 11])                                % Defines x-axis limits 
 
%% Plot Natural Log Trendline from AQ Alliance Network 
hold on; 
AQx = (0:11); 





%% Chris Price & Aaron Green                                              % 
% This file simulates the spread of chemical weapons TTP throughout a     % 
% one-mode, inter-organizational network of Violent Non-State Actors      % 
% either operating in Myanmar or tied to a group operating in Myanmar.    % 
% The network is disrupted by removing the 2 most central nodes’ CW       % 
% attribute.                                                              % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
clear; clc; clf;                               % clears previous variables 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
%% USER INPUTS: 
% User inputs rate of diffusion of chemical weapon TTP: 
dif = 0.049;                                % 4.9 percent 
 
% User inputs number of VNSA (nodes) CP assets will “Coerce” to remove the 
% CW attribute: 
coerce = 2;                                 % 2 nodes 
 
% User inputs number of timesteps to run: 
num_steps = 10;                             % 10 years (plus starting from  
                                           % year zero) 
                                            
N = 1000;                                   % number of simulations 
MAVchemSims = zeros(N,num_steps+2);         % Initialize variable 
AveChem = zeros(1,num_steps+2);             % Initialize average num CW nodes 
vector 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                                             
%% Read Data:   
   MAVtable0 = readtable(‘MAV_dichotomized.xlsx’,’TreatAsEmpty’,{‘‘});  % input 
MAV network       
   MAVtable0{:,2:end}(isnan(MAVtable0{:,2:end})) = 0;% converts NaN to zero 
   MAV0 = table2array(MAVtable0(:,2:end));          % converts table to array 
   MAVchem_table0 = readtable(‘MYR_chem.xlsx’);     % input chem attribute in 
table 
   MAVchem0 = table2array(MAVchem_table0(:,2:end)); % converts table to array 
 
%% Determine the 2 nodes with highest degree centrality: 
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   num_ties = sum(MAV0)-1;                         % sums num of ties for each 
node 
   coerced = maxk(num_ties,coerce);                % finds k (coerce) largest 
elements of array 
   ixcoerced = zeros(coerce,1); 
   for c = 1:length(coerced) 
       ixcoerced(c) = find(num_ties == coerced(c));% indexes node(s) with 
highest 
                                                   % degree centrality 
   end 
 
   fprintf(‘The %.0f nodes with highest degree centrality: \n’,coerce) 
   MAVtable0(ixcoerced,1) 
        
% Modify the one-mode network’s attribute vector to simulate Coerceive 
Disruption: 
   MAVchem0(ixcoerced) = 0; 
    
%% 
for jj=1:N                                  % for N simulations... 
   t = 0:num_steps;                                 % timesteps vector 
   
% Simulation Starts... 
   % Make a 3-d matrix of MAV over time (3rd dim is time): 
   MAV = zeros(99,99,num_steps+1);         % 99 x 99 x 11 matrix 
   for m=1:num_steps+1 
       MAV(:,:,m) = MAV0;                  % initialize MAV at each timestep  
   end                                     % as MAV0 (this assumes chem 
attribute 
                                           % doesn’t go away once obtained). 
 
   % initalize matrix that indexes chem-capable VNSA at each timestep: 
   for m=1:num_steps+1 
       MAVchem(:,:,m) = MAVchem0; 
   end 
 
   %% 
   for m = 1:num_steps+1                  % for each time step... 
 
       % If a VNSA is chem-capable, then dif % of its 1st degree affiliates 
will 
       % become chem-capable. 
       ichem = find(MAVchem(:,:,m)== 1); % indexes chem-capable VNSA 
       if m>1 
           clear chem_add;                 % reset for each column 
           chem_add(:,1,m-1) = zeros(length(sum(MAV(:,(ichem),m))),1); 
       end 
       % determine how many VNSA need to become chem-capable for each 
       % timestep: 
       chem_add(:,1,m) = (round(sum(MAV(:,(ichem),m)).*dif))’; 
 
       for a = 1:length(chem_add(:,1,m))       % for each VNSA that has chem... 
           if chem_add(a,1,m)>0                % if chem_add for this VNSA is 
positive... 
               b = chem_add(a,1,m);        
 
               % define the a-th column of the m-th MAV network: 
               V = MAV(:,ichem(a,1),m); 
               v = sum(V);             % number of VNSA #a’s ties 
               vec = find(V==1);       % row numbers of a-th column of m-th MAV 
matrix 
                                       % indicating each tie of VNSA #a 
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               %column vector listing b random VNSA 
               r = randperm(numel(vec),b)’;        
               for k = 1:length(r)     % for the k-th element of vector r... 
                   kk = r(k);          % get the value of k-th element of r. 
                   MAVchem(kk,1,m)=1;  % the VNSA becomes CW-capable 
                   MAVchem(ixcoerced,m) = 0;    % (unless it was Coercively 
                                               % Disrupted by CP forces) 
               end 
           end 
       end 
      n(1,m+1) = sum(MAVchem(:,1,m)); 
      x = (0:num_steps+1); 
      if m<=num_steps+1 
          MAVchem(:,:,m+1)=MAVchem(:,1,m); 
      end 
   end 
   n(1,1) = sum(MAVchem0); 
   plot(x,n); hold on; 
    
% Put the Chemical Attribute into a matrix that captures multiple simulations: 
MAVchemSims(jj,:) = n(1,:); 
 
% Clears certain variables to re-run next simulation: 
clearvars -EXCEPT N x dif num_steps jj MAVchemSims AveChem MAV MAV0 MAVchem 
MAVchem0 coerce ixcoerced;    
 
end 
%% Write Excel Files to Export to SNA Software 
MAVspreadco = MAV(:,:,4); 
xlswrite(‘MAV3spreadco.xlsx’,MAVspreadco) 
MAVchem3spreadco = MAVchem(:,:,4); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem3spreadco.xlsx’,MAVchem3spreadco) 
 
MAV6spreadco = MAV(:,:,7); 
xlswrite(‘MAV6spreadco.xlsx’,MAV6spreadco) 
MAVchem6spreadco = MAVchem(:,:,7); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem6spreadco.xlsx’,MAVchem6spreadco) 
 
MAV10spreadco = MAV(:,:,11); 
xlswrite(‘MAV10spreadco.xlsx’,MAV10spreadco) 
MAVchem10spreadco = MAVchem(:,:,11); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem10spreadco.xlsx’,MAVchem10spreadco) 
 
%% Creates Cumulative Plots 
AveChem(1,:) = mean(MAVchemSims); 
plot(x,AveChem,’*-k’,’LineWidth’,3) 
% Format Plot: 
grid on; 
title({‘MAV Network: CW TTP Migration, Diffusion Rate = 4.9%’;’Coercive 
Disruption: CW removed from 2 nodes with highest degree centrality’;’Number of 
simulations = 1000’}) 
xlabel(‘Time (years)’); 
ylabel(‘Number of CW-Capable VNSAs’); 
 
% Calculate mean values at years 3, 6, and 10: 
values = round([mean(MAVchemSims(:,3)) mean(MAVchemSims(:,6)) 
mean(MAVchemSims(:,10))],1); 
 
% Print mean values on plot as string: 
txt3 = text(2.6,16,num2str(values(1)));      % Mean value at 3 years 
txt6 = text(5.6,19,num2str(values(2)));      % Mean value at 6 years 
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txt10 = text(9.6,24,num2str(values(3)));     % Mean value at 10 yrs 
xlim([0 11])                                 % Defines x-axis limits 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Chris Price & Aaron Green                                              % 
% This file simulates the spread of chemical weapons TTP throughout a     % 
% one-mode, inter-organizational network of Violent Non-State Actors      % 
% either operating in Myanmar or tied to a group operating in Myanmar.    % 
% The network is disrupted by removing ties from the 2 nodes with the     % 
% highest brokerage scores.                                               % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
clear; clc; clf;                               % clears previous variables 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
%% USER INPUTS: 
% User inputs rate of diffusion of chemical weapon TTP: 
dif = 0.5;                                 % 4.9 percent 
% User inputs # of IO disruptions (cut 50% of ties for this many nodes): 
numIO = 2; 
ties2cut = 0.5;         % 50% of ties between targeted node and its adjacent 
nodes 
% User inputs number of timesteps to run: 
num_steps = 10;                             % 10 years (plus starting from  
                                           % year zero) 
N = 1000;                                   % number of simulations 
MAVchemSims = zeros(N,num_steps+2);         % Initialize variable 
AveChem = zeros(1,num_steps+2);             % Initialize average num CW nodes 
vector 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
%% Import Data 
   % Import MAV network after cutting appropriate amount of ties from 
   % nodes with the highest brokerage scores (as determined by SNA 
   % software): 
   MAVtable0 = readtable(‘MAV_dichotomized_cutties.xlsx’,’TreatAsEmpty’,{‘‘});   
   MAVtable0{:,2:end}(isnan(MAVtable0{:,2:end})) = 0;% converts NaN to zero 
   MAV0 = table2array(MAVtable0(:,2:end));          % converts table to array 
   MAVchem_table0 = readtable(‘MYR_chem.xlsx’);     % input chem attribute in 
table 








   t = 0:num_steps;                        % timesteps vector 
    
% Simulation Stars... 
   % Make a 3-d matrix of MAV over time (3rd dim is time): 
   MAV = zeros(99,99,num_steps+1);         % 99 x 99 x 11 matrix 
   for m=1:num_steps+1 
       MAV(:,:,m) = MAV0;                  % initialize MAV at each timestep  
   end                                     % as MAV0 (this assumes chem 
attribute 
                                           % doesn’t go away once obtained). 
 
   % initalize matrix that indexes chem-capable VNSA at each timestep: 
   for m=1:num_steps+1 
       MAVchem(:,:,m) = MAVchem0; 
   end 
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   %% 
   for m = 1:num_steps+1                  % for each time step... 
 
% If a VNSA is chem-capable, then 4.9% of its 1st degree affiliates will 
       % become chem-capable. 
 
       ichem = find(MAVchem(:,:,m)== 1); % indexes chem-capable VNSA 
 
       if m>1 
           clear chem_add;                 % reset for each column 
           chem_add(:,1,m-1) = zeros(length(sum(MAV(:,(ichem),m))),1); 
       end 
 
       % determine how many VNSA need to become chem-capable for each 
       % timestep: 
       chem_add(:,1,m) = (round(sum(MAV(:,(ichem),m)).*dif.*1/3))’; 
 
 
       for a = 1:length(chem_add(:,1,m))   % for each VNSA that has chem... 
           if chem_add(a,1,m)>0    % if chem_add for this VNSA is positive... 
               b = chem_add(a,1,m);        
 
               % define the a-th column of the m-th MAV network: 
               V = MAV(:,ichem(a,1),m); 
 
               v = sum(V);             % number of VNSA #a’s ties 
               vec = find(V==1);% row nums of a-th column of m-th MAV matrix 
                                       % indicating each tie of VNSA #a 
 
               %column vector listing b random VNSA 
               r = randperm(numel(vec),b)’;        
               for k = 1:length(r)     % for the k-th element of vector r... 
                   kk = r(k);          % get the value of k-th element of r. 
                   MAVchem(kk,1,m)=1; 
               end 
           end 
       end 
      n(1,m+1) = sum(MAVchem(:,1,m)); 
      x = (0:num_steps+1); 
 
      if m<=num_steps+1 
          MAVchem(:,:,m+1)=MAVchem(:,1,m); 
      end 
 
   end 
   n(1,1) = sum(MAVchem0); 
   plot(x,n); hold on; 
    
% Put the Chemical Attribute into a matrix that captures multiple simulations: 
MAVchemSims(jj,:) = n(1,:); 
 
% Clears certain variables to re-run next simulation: 
clearvars -EXCEPT N x dif num_steps jj MAVchemSims AveChem MAV MAV0 MAVchem 
MAVchem0;    
 
end 
%% Write Excel Files to Export to SNA Software 
MAVspreadio = MAV(:,:,4); 
xlswrite(‘MAV3spreadio.xlsx’,MAVspreadio) 
MAVchem3spreadio = MAVchem(:,:,4); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem3spreadio.xlsx’,MAVchem3spreadio) 
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MAV6spreadio = MAV(:,:,7); 
xlswrite(‘MAV6spreadio.xlsx’,MAV6spreadio) 
MAVchem6spreadio = MAVchem(:,:,7); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem6spreadio.xlsx’,MAVchem6spreadio) 
 
MAV10spreadio = MAV(:,:,11); 
xlswrite(‘MAV10spreadio.xlsx’,MAV10spreadio) 
MAVchem10spreadio = MAVchem(:,:,11); 
xlswrite(‘MAVchem10spreadio.xlsx’,MAVchem10spreadio) 
  
%% Creates Cumulative Plots 
AveChem(1,:) = mean(MAVchemSims); 
plot(x,AveChem,’*-k’,’LineWidth’,3) 
% Format Plot: 
grid on; 
title({‘MAV Network: CW TTP Migration, Diffusion Rate = 4.9%’;’IO 
Disruption’;’Number of simulations = 1000’}) 
xlabel(‘Time (years)’); 
ylabel(‘Number of CW-Capable VNSA’); 
 
% Calculate mean values at years 3, 6, and 10: 
values = round([mean(MAVchemSims(:,3)) mean(MAVchemSims(:,6)) 
mean(MAVchemSims(:,10))],1); 
 
% Print mean values on plot as string: 
txt3 = text(2.6,16,num2str(values(1)))      % Mean value at 3 years 
txt6 = text(5.6,19,num2str(values(2)))      % Mean value at 6 years 
txt10 = text(9.6,24,num2str(values(3)))     % Mean value at 10 yrs 
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APPENDIX C.  MAV NETWORK ORGANIZATIONS 
Organization Name Primary Countries of Operation 
313 Brigade Pakistan (313) Pakistan 
969 Movement- Wirathu (969) Myanmar 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Philippines 
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), aka 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) Myanmar, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan 
Ahle-hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB) Bangladesh 
al Madina (AM) Pakistan, Kashmir, India 
al-Fatah (AF) Palestine 
All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU) Myanmar 
All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) Myanmar, Thailand 
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) Bangladesh 
al-Qaeda (AQ) Global 
al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Myanmar, India, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Pakistan 
Aqa Mul Mujahidin (AMM) Myanmar 
Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), aka Arakan 
Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) Myanmar, Bangladesh 
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)/Faith 
Movement of Arakan (FMA)/Harrakah al Yaqeen Myanmar 
Black Headbands (BH) Myanmar 
Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) aka Buddhist Power Force Sri Lanka 
Burma Communist Party (BCP) Myanmar 
Chin National Army (CNA), aka Cin National Force 
(CNF) Myanmar 
Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPN-M) Nepal 
Darul Islam (DI) Indonesia 
DBKA- 333 BDE Myanmar 
DBKA- 555 BDE Myanmar 
DBKA- 777 BDE Myanmar 
DBKA- 999 BDE Myanmar 
Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) Myanmar 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) Myanmar, Thailand 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North 
Korea (DPRK) North Korea 
English Defense League (EDL) England 
God’s Army Myanmar, Thailand 
Harakat al-Yaqin (HAY) Myanmar, Bangladesh 
Harakat ul-Ansar (HuA) Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Tajikistan 
Harakut ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI)/Burma Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan 
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Organization Name Primary Countries of Operation 
Harakut ul-Jihad-i-Islami Arakan (HuJI-A) Myanmar, Pakistan 
Harakut ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) Bangladesh 
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) India, Pakistan 
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) India, Bangladesh 
Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) Myanmar, India 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Uzbekistan 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Army (AIS) Algeria, Sudan, Iran, Germany, France, Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt 
Islamic State Philippines (ISEA) Philippines 
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Pakistan 
Jama’at ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Bangladesh 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Philippines 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Myanmar 
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lap (KYKL) India 
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) India 
Karen/Kayin National Liberation Army (KNLA), aka 
Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) Myanmar, Thailand 
Karen/Kayin National Union (KNU) Myanmar, Thailand 
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) Myanmar, Thailand 
Kebangkitan Mujahid Rohingya (KMR) Myanmar, Bangladesh 
Khmer Serei Guerrillas (KhSG) Cambodia 
Khun Sa Guerrillas (KSG) Myanmar 
Kongra-Gel Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK) Turkey, Iraq 
Kuki Liberation Organization (KLO) Myanmar, India 
Kuki National Army (KNA), Organization (KNO) Myanmar, India 
Kuki National Council (KNC) Myanmar, India 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, 
Syria, Australia, Bangladesh, Bosnia, France, 
Philippines 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
India, Germany, Canada, Afghanistan, Australia, 
Bangladesh, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar (Burma), Netherlands, New Zealand, 
North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States. 
Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF) India, Myanmar 
Mong Thai Army (MTA), aka Shan Land Army Myanmar 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Philippines 
Muslim Liberation Organization of Burma (MLOB), 
aka Arakan Liberation Organization Myanmar 
Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF)- Tatmadaw Myanmar 
Myanmar’s Military Junta (Junta) Myanmar 
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Organization Name Primary Countries of Operation 
National Coalition Government of the Union of 
Burma (NCGUB) United States 
National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) United States 
National Democratic Front- Burma (NDF) Myanmar 
National League for Democracy (NLD) Myanmar 
National Liberation Front of Arunachai Pradesh 
(NLFA) China/Tibet, Myanmar, India 
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) Myanmar, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah 
(NSCN-IM) India, Myanmar 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khapang 
(NSCN-K) Myanmar, India 
People’s Army- Myanmar (PAM) Myanmar 
People’s Liberation Army- India/Manipur (PLAI) Myanmar, India, Bangladesh 
People’s Liberation Army- Sri Lanka (JVP) Sri Lanka 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) China 
People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak 
(PREPAK) Myanmar, India, Bangladesh 
Rabitat ul Mujahidin (RuM), aka Legion of 
Mujahidin Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand 
Revolutionary People’s Front- Bangladesh (RPFB) Bangladesh, India 
Rohingya Liberation Army (RLA) Myanmar 
Rohingya Mujahideen (RM) Myanmar, India, Sri Lanka 
Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) Myanmar, Bangladesh 
Russia Russia 
Shan State Army (SSA) Myanmar 
Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) Myanmar 
Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) Myanmar 
State Law & Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 
aka State Peace & Development Council Myanmar 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTP) Pakistan 
Tripura People’s Democratic Front (TPDF) India 
United Achik National Front (UNAF) India, Bangladesh 
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Myanmar, China, Bhutan 
United National Liberation Front (UNLF) Myanmar, India, Bangladesh 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) Myanmar 
United Wa State Party (UWSP) Myanmar 
Vegetarian Soldiers (VS) Myanmar, Thailand 
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors Myanmar, Thailand 
White Headbands (WH) Myanmar, Thailand 
Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) Myanmar, India 
Zomi Revolutionary Organization (ZRO) Myanmar, India 
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